元认知和心理理论与决策不确定性的不同神经表征相关。

Metacognition and mentalizing are associated with distinct neural representations of decision uncertainty.

机构信息

State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning and IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China.

出版信息

PLoS Biol. 2022 May 13;20(5):e3001301. doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.3001301. eCollection 2022 May.

Abstract

Metacognition and mentalizing are both associated with meta-level mental state representations. Conventionally, metacognition refers to monitoring one's own cognitive processes, while mentalizing refers to monitoring others' cognitive processes. However, this self-other dichotomy is insufficient to delineate the 2 high-level mental processes. We here used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to systematically investigate the neural representations of different levels of decision uncertainty in monitoring different targets (the current self, the past self [PS], and others) performing a perceptual decision-making task. Our results reveal diverse formats of internal mental state representations of decision uncertainty in mentalizing, separate from the associations with external cue information. External cue information was commonly represented in the right inferior parietal lobe (IPL) across the mentalizing tasks. However, the internal mental states of decision uncertainty attributed to others were uniquely represented in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), rather than the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) that also represented the object-level mental states of decision inaccuracy attributed to others. Further, the object-level and meta-level mental states of decision uncertainty, when attributed to the PS, were represented in the precuneus and the lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), respectively. In contrast, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) represented currently experienced decision uncertainty in metacognition, and also uncertainty about the estimated decision uncertainty (estimate uncertainty), but not the estimated decision uncertainty per se in mentalizing. Hence, our findings identify neural signatures to clearly delineate metacognition and mentalizing and further imply distinct neural computations on internal mental states of decision uncertainty during metacognition and mentalizing.

摘要

元认知和心理理论都与元级别的心理状态表示有关。传统上,元认知是指监控自己的认知过程,而心理理论是指监控他人的认知过程。然而,这种自我-他人的二分法不足以描绘这两个高级心理过程。我们使用功能磁共振成像(fMRI)系统地研究了在执行感知决策任务时,不同水平的决策不确定性在监控不同目标(当前自我、过去自我[PS]和他人)时的神经表示。我们的结果揭示了心理理论中决策不确定性的不同形式的内部心理状态表示,与外部线索信息分离。外部线索信息在心理理论任务中普遍在右顶下小叶(IPL)中表示。然而,归因于他人的决策不确定性的内部心理状态在背侧前扣带回(dmPFC)中被独特地表示,而不是颞顶联合(TPJ),后者也表示归因于他人的决策不准确的对象级心理状态。此外,当归因于 PS 时,决策不确定性的对象级和元级心理状态分别在楔前叶和外侧额极皮质(lFPC)中表示。相比之下,背侧前扣带回(dACC)在元认知中表示当前经历的决策不确定性,也表示对估计的决策不确定性(估计不确定性)的不确定性,但在心理理论中并不表示对估计的决策不确定性本身的不确定性。因此,我们的发现确定了神经特征,以清楚地区分元认知和心理理论,并进一步暗示在元认知和心理理论中对决策不确定性的内部心理状态进行了不同的神经计算。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/6ab5/9132335/a0fe51439181/pbio.3001301.g001.jpg

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