Nganmeni Zéphirin, Pongou Roland, Tchantcho Bertrand, Tondji Jean-Baptiste
UFR AES - Economics and Management, Dionysian Economics Laboratory (L.E.D.) Université Paris 8 Saint-Denis France.
Department of Economics University of Ottawa Ottawa Ontario Canada.
J Public Econ Theory. 2022 Apr 27. doi: 10.1111/jpet.12590.
In majoritarian democracies, popular policies may not be inclusive, and inclusive policies may not be popular. This dilemma raises the crucial question of when it is possible to design a policy that is both inclusive and popular. We address this question in the context of vaccine allocation in a polarized economy facing a pandemic. In such an economy, individuals are organized around distinct networks and groups and have in-group preferences. We provide a complete characterization of the set of inclusive and popular vaccine allocations. The findings imply that the number of vaccine doses necessary to generate an inclusive and popular vaccine allocation is greater than the one necessary to obtain an allocation that is only popular. The analysis further reveals that it is always possible to design the decision-making rule of the economy to implement an inclusive and popular vaccine allocation. Under such a rule, the composition of any group endowed with the veto power should necessarily reflect the diversity of the society.
在多数主义民主国家，受欢迎的政策可能不具有包容性，而具有包容性的政策可能不受欢迎。这一困境提出了一个关键问题，即何时有可能设计出一项既具有包容性又受欢迎的政策。我们在面临大流行病的两极分化经济中的疫苗分配背景下解决这个问题。在这样的经济中，个人围绕不同的网络和群体组织起来，并具有群体内偏好。我们对包容性和受欢迎的疫苗分配集进行了完整的刻画。研究结果表明，产生包容性和受欢迎的疫苗分配所需的疫苗剂量数量大于获得仅受欢迎的分配所需的剂量数量。分析进一步表明，总是有可能设计经济的决策规则以实施包容性和受欢迎的疫苗分配。在这样的规则下，任何拥有否决权的群体的组成必然应反映社会的多样性。
