Department for the Study of Culture, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, 5230, Odense M, Denmark.
Med Health Care Philos. 2022 Dec;25(4):603-613. doi: 10.1007/s11019-022-10100-4. Epub 2022 Jul 7.
Phenomenology of illness has grown increasingly popular in recent times. However, the most prominent phenomenologists of illness defend a psychologizing notion of phenomenology, which argues that illness is primarily constituted by embodied experiences, feelings, and emotions of suffering, alienation etc. The article argues that this gives rise to three issues that need to be addressed. (1) How is the theory of embodiment compatible with the strong distinction between disease and illness? (2) What is the difference between problematic embodiment and illness? (3) How is existential edification, that illness can give rise to according to the phenomenologists, to be understood? The article then engages in an analysis of Heidegger's and Waldenfels' phenomenology with the ambition of developing a notion of existence, which can transgress the psychologization of illness. Rather than arguing that illness is constituted by experiences of suffering and alienation, it emphasizes that broaches upon conatively guided activities constitute illness.
近年来，疾病现象学越来越受欢迎。然而，大多数著名的疾病现象学家捍卫一种将现象学心理学化的观点，即认为疾病主要由身体体验、痛苦、异化等感受和情绪构成。本文认为，这引发了三个需要解决的问题。（1）身体理论如何与疾病和疾病之间的强烈区别相兼容？（2）有问题的身体和疾病有什么区别？（3）根据现象学家的说法，疾病如何引起存在的升华，应该如何理解？本文随后对海德格尔和瓦尔登费尔斯的现象学进行了分析，旨在发展一种能够超越疾病心理学化的存在概念。它不是主张疾病是由痛苦和异化的体验构成的，而是强调，意向性指导的活动构成了疾病。
