Svenaeus F
University of Linköping, Department of Health and Society, Sweden.
Med Health Care Philos. 2000;3(2):125-37. doi: 10.1023/a:1009920011164.
This article is an attempt to analyse the experience of embodiment in illness. Drawing upon Heidegger's phenomenology and the suggestion that illness can be understood as unhomelike being-in-the-world, I try to show how the way we live our own bodies in illness is experienced precisely as unhomelike. The body is alien, yet, at the same time, myself. It involves biological processes beyond my control, but these processes still belong to me as lived by me. This a priori otherness of the body presents itself in illness in an uncanny and merciless way. The unhomelike breakdown of our everyday being-in-the-world suffered in illness is explored through Heidegger's notion of the world being a "totality of relevance", a pattern of meaning played out between different "tools". The lived body is compared to a broken tool that alters and obstructs our way of being "thrown" and "projecting" ourselves in the meaning patterns of the world through feelings, thoughts and actions. The similarities and differences between this unhomelikeness of illness and the specific unhomelikeness of authentic understanding, reached according to Heidegger in existential anxiety, are discussed. In order to illustrate how the lived body can present itself as "broken" and "other" to its owner, and in what way this unhomelike experience calls for help from health-care professionals, I make use of a clinical example of a severe and common disease: stroke.
本文试图分析疾病中具身化的体验。借鉴海德格尔的现象学以及疾病可被理解为在世界中无家可归的存在这一观点，我试图展示我们在疾病中体验自身身体的方式恰恰是无家可归的。身体是陌生的，但同时，它也是我自己的。它涉及我无法控制的生物过程，但这些过程仍然是我所经历的，属于我。身体这种先验的他异性在疾病中以一种离奇且无情的方式呈现出来。通过海德格尔关于世界是一个“相关性整体”的概念，即不同“工具”之间展开的一种意义模式，来探讨我们在疾病中遭受的日常在世的无家可归式的崩溃。被体验的身体被比作一件损坏的工具，它改变并阻碍我们通过情感、思想和行动在世界的意义模式中“被抛”和“投射”自身的方式。本文还讨论了疾病的这种无家可归感与海德格尔所说的在生存焦虑中达到的本真理解的特定无家可归感之间的异同。为了说明被体验的身体如何能向其所有者呈现为“损坏的”和“他者的”，以及这种无家可归的体验以何种方式需要医护专业人员的帮助，我利用了一种严重且常见疾病的临床实例：中风。
