Burbrink Frank T, Crother Brian I, Murray Christopher M, Smith Brian Tilston, Ruane Sara, Myers Edward A, Pyron Robert Alexander
Department of Herpetology American Museum of Natural History New York New York USA.
Department of Biological Sciences Southeastern Louisiana University Hammond Louisiana USA.
Ecol Evol. 2022 Jul 10;12(7):e9069. doi: 10.1002/ece3.9069. eCollection 2022 Jul.
Species-level taxonomy derives from empirical sources (data and techniques) that assess the existence of spatiotemporal evolutionary lineages via various species "concepts." These concepts determine if observed lineages are independent given a particular methodology and ontology, which relates the metaphysical species concept to what "kind" of thing a species is in reality. Often, species concepts fail to link epistemology back to ontology. This lack of coherence is in part responsible for the persistence of the subspecies rank, which in modern usage often functions as a placeholder between the evolutionary events of divergence or collapse of incipient species. Thus, prospective events like lineages merging or diverging require information from unknowable future information. This is also conditioned on evidence that the lineage already has a detectably distinct evolutionary history. Ranking these lineages as subspecies can seem attractive given that many lineages do not exhibit intrinsic reproductive isolation. We argue that using subspecies is indefensible on philosophical and empirical grounds. Ontologically, the rank of subspecies is either identical to that of species or undefined in the context of evolutionary lineages representing spatiotemporally defined individuals. Some species concepts more inclined to consider subspecies, like the Biological Species Concept, are disconnected from evolutionary ontology and do not consider genealogy. Even if ontology is ignored, methods addressing reproductive isolation are often indirect and fail to capture the range of scenarios linking gene flow to species identity over space and time. The use of subspecies and reliance on reproductive isolation as a basis for an operational species concept can also conflict with ethical issues governing the protection of species. We provide a way forward for recognizing and naming species that links theoretical and operational species concepts regardless of the magnitude of reproductive isolation.
物种层面的分类法源自经验性来源（数据和技术），这些来源通过各种物种“概念”评估时空进化谱系的存在。这些概念根据特定的方法和本体论来确定观察到的谱系是否独立，而本体论将形而上学的物种概念与物种在现实中属于何种“事物”联系起来。通常，物种概念未能将认识论与本体论联系起来。这种缺乏连贯性在一定程度上导致了亚种等级的持续存在，在现代用法中，亚种等级常常充当新物种分化或崩溃等进化事件之间的一个占位符。因此，诸如谱系合并或分化等未来事件需要来自不可知的未来信息。这也取决于该谱系已经具有可检测到的独特进化历史的证据。鉴于许多谱系没有表现出内在的生殖隔离，将这些谱系列为亚种似乎很有吸引力。我们认为，从哲学和实证的角度来看，使用亚种是站不住脚的。在本体论上，亚种的等级要么与物种的等级相同，要么在代表时空定义个体的进化谱系的背景下是未定义的。一些更倾向于考虑亚种的物种概念，如生物学物种概念，与进化本体论脱节，不考虑谱系。即使忽略本体论，处理生殖隔离的方法往往也是间接的，无法涵盖将基因流动与物种在空间和时间上的身份联系起来的各种情况。使用亚种以及将生殖隔离作为操作性物种概念的基础也可能与保护物种的伦理问题相冲突。我们提供了一种识别和命名物种的方法，该方法将理论和操作性物种概念联系起来，而不管生殖隔离的程度如何。
