Wang Panna, Su Chun, Xu Botao
Accounting School, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing, China.
Front Psychol. 2022 Jul 12;13:888805. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.888805. eCollection 2022.
In countries with a high degree of equity concentration, such as China, the second type of agency problem is serious in which major shareholders of listed companies encroach on the interests of small and medium shareholders through private placement. As a financial transaction system, the short-selling mechanism has the function of external corporate governance. Therefore, this paper examines the impact of relaxing short-selling controls on companies' private placements. Based on the quasi-natural experiment of China's gradual relaxation of short-selling controls since 2010, a double-difference model (DID) test is constructed to find that relaxing short-selling controls reduces companies' private placement tendency and amount, and this effect is mainly reflected in samples with a higher degree of equity checks and balances. Further analysis found that when the size of the company's financing constraints is different, the impact of relaxing short-selling control on the company's private placement tendency and amount is different; when the chairman and the general manager have two positions, relaxing short-selling control reduces the company's private placement options, but it has a negative impact on the company's private placement. There is no difference in the impact of the company's private placement amount. It can be excluded that the relaxation of short-selling control suppresses the company's placement through financing constraints and corporate governance mechanisms. Compared to a good information environment, when the company's information environment is poor, relaxing short-selling controls reduces the company's private placement tendency and amount. Significantly, it shows that the relaxation of short-selling control policy and supervision inhibits the company's private placement through the information environment mechanism, and promotes the sustainable development of enterprises. It not only improves the literature in the field of short-selling mechanism affecting corporate behavior, but it also enriches the research on the transfer of benefits of private placement of companies.
在股权高度集中的国家，如中国，第二类代理问题较为严重，即上市公司大股东通过定向增发侵害中小股东利益。作为一种金融交易制度，卖空机制具有外部公司治理功能。因此，本文考察放松卖空管制对公司定向增发的影响。基于中国自2010年以来逐步放松卖空管制的准自然实验，构建双重差分模型（DID）检验发现，放松卖空管制会降低公司定向增发的倾向和金额，且这种效应主要体现在股权制衡度较高的样本中。进一步分析发现，当公司融资约束规模不同时，放松卖空管制对公司定向增发倾向和金额的影响不同；当董事长与总经理两职合一时，放松卖空管制会减少公司定向增发选择，但对公司定向增发金额的影响不具有差异性。可以排除卖空管制放松通过融资约束和公司治理机制抑制公司增发的影响。与信息环境良好相比，当公司信息环境较差时，放松卖空管制会降低公司定向增发倾向和金额。显著地，表明卖空管制政策与监管放松通过信息环境机制抑制了公司定向增发，促进了企业可持续发展。这不仅完善了卖空机制影响公司行为领域的文献，还丰富了公司定向增发利益输送的研究。
