He Chun Xi, Soh Wei Ni, Ong Tze San, Lau Wei Theng, Zhong Bin
School of Business and Economics, University Putra Malaysia, Serdang, Malaysia.
Front Psychol. 2022 May 20;13:857585. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.857585. eCollection 2022.
This paper selected as the case to study the governance problems of and the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders under the situation of equity disputes. At the same time, the study further explored the advantages and disadvantages of the dispersed ownership structure, the long-term impact on the company's development and the choice of the involved corporate governance methods under the current Chinese capital market conditions. This paper adopted the event research method and selected the period from June 2015 to June 2017 (24 months) as the observation period to analyze the market performance impact of in the equity disputes. At the same time, this paper also measured 's individual stock rate of return ( ) and market rate of return ( ), and calculated 's normal rate of return [( )], abnormal rate of return ( ), and cumulative abnormal rate of return ( ) during different event windows ([-3,10]). 's shareholding was too dispersed and the stock price had been sluggish for a long time, which had greatly reduced the acquisition difficulty and cost of , thus triggering the "barbarian invasion" of . In the struggle for control, whether it was 's anti-takeover measures or , , and 's competition for equity, their actions had harmed the interests of small and medium shareholders. The market supervision department was too lenient to supervise and punish the interests of small and medium shareholders, and opportunism made behaviors that infringe on the interests of others more reckless. However, small and medium shareholders cannot actively participate in the company's management decision-making to safeguard their legitimate rights and interests, which intensifies the violations of all parties in the equity disputes, thus forming a vicious circle. Therefore, the protection of the interests of small and medium shareholders required the joint efforts and consciousness of regulators, small and medium shareholders, and acquirers.
本文选取[公司名称]作为案例，研究股权纠纷情况下的治理问题以及中小股东利益保护。同时，研究进一步探讨了股权分散结构的优缺点、对公司发展的长期影响以及当前中国资本市场条件下所涉及的公司治理方式选择。本文采用事件研究法，选取2015年6月至2017年6月（24个月）作为观察期，分析[公司名称]在股权纠纷中的市场绩效影响。同时，本文还测算[公司名称]的个股回报率（[个股回报率指标]）和市场回报率（[市场回报率指标]），并计算不同事件窗口（[-3,10]）期间[公司名称]的正常回报率[（[正常回报率计算方式]）]、异常回报率（[异常回报率指标]）和累计异常回报率（[累计异常回报率指标]）。[公司名称]股权过于分散且股价长期低迷，极大降低了[收购方公司名称]的收购难度和成本，从而引发了[收购方公司名称]的“野蛮人入侵”。在控制权争夺中，无论是[目标公司名称]的反收购措施，还是[竞争对手公司1名称]、[竞争对手公司2名称]和[竞争对手公司3名称]对股权的争夺，其行为均损害了中小股东利益。市场监管部门对中小股东利益监管处罚过于宽松，机会主义使得侵害他人利益的行为更加肆无忌惮。然而，中小股东无法积极参与公司管理决策以维护自身合法权益，这加剧了股权纠纷中各方的侵权行为，并由此形成恶性循环。因此，中小股东利益保护需要监管者、中小股东和收购方的共同努力与自觉。
