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危机时期的权力下放:资产还是负债?以新冠疫情期间的德国和意大利为例

Decentralisation in Times of Crisis: Asset Or Liability? The Case of Germany and Italy During Covid-19.

作者信息

Kuhn Katharina, Morlino Irene

机构信息

London School of Economics and Political Science.

出版信息

Schweiz Z Polit. 2022 Mar;28(1):105-115. doi: 10.1111/spsr.12482. Epub 2021 Oct 8.

DOI:10.1111/spsr.12482
PMID:35924083
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8662272/
Abstract

How did the legal and political-administrative relationship between central and local governments of two decentralised states shape their response to COVID-19? Literature and theories on decentralisation argue that federal and decentralised states are less able to respond to crises in a coordinated manner due to their perceived greater susceptibility to political conflict. Situated within this theoretical debate and based on the analysis of legal acts, political decisions, and relevant national news media articles between March and August 2020 in Germany and Italy, this research note shows that, counterintuitively, more decentralisation does not necessarily translate into more legal and political stress during pandemic management. In responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, Germany, a highly decentralised state, experienced less legal and political tensions than the less decentralised Italy. The key to understanding this variation lies in different institutional arrangements, complemented by the specific political cultures of both states.

摘要

两个权力下放国家的中央与地方政府之间的法律及政治行政关系是如何塑造它们对新冠疫情的应对措施的?关于权力下放的文献和理论认为,联邦制和权力下放的国家由于被认为更容易陷入政治冲突,因此较难协调应对危机。基于这一理论辩论,并通过对2020年3月至8月德国和意大利的法律行为、政治决策及相关国家新闻媒体文章的分析,本研究报告表明,与直觉相反的是,在疫情管理期间,权力下放程度越高并不一定意味着法律和政治压力就越大。在应对新冠疫情时,权力高度下放的德国所经历的法律和政治紧张局势比权力下放程度较低的意大利要少。理解这种差异的关键在于不同的制度安排,并辅以两国各自特定的政治文化。

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本文引用的文献

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Trust, but customize: federalism's impact on the Canadian COVID-19 response.信任,但需因地制宜:联邦制对加拿大应对新冠疫情的影响
Policy Soc. 2020 Jun 19;39(3):382-402. doi: 10.1080/14494035.2020.1783788. eCollection 2020 Sep.
2
The impacts of decentralization on health system equity, efficiency and resilience: a realist synthesis of the evidence.去中心化对卫生系统公平性、效率和弹性的影响:证据的现实主义综合。
Health Policy Plan. 2019 Oct 1;34(8):605-617. doi: 10.1093/heapol/czz055.
3
Conceptualizing decentralization in European health systems: a functional perspective.从功能视角对欧洲卫生系统中的分权进行概念化
Health Econ Policy Law. 2006 Apr;1(Pt 2):127-47. doi: 10.1017/S1744133105001209.