Department of Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet, SE-17177 Stockholm, Sweden
Department of Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet, SE-17177 Stockholm, Sweden.
J Neurosci. 2022 Sep 14;42(37):7131-7143. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0656-22.2022. Epub 2022 Aug 8.
How do we come to sense that a hand in view belongs to our own body or not? Previous studies have suggested that the integration of vision and somatosensation in the frontoparietal areas plays a critical role in the sense of body ownership (i.e., the multisensory perception of limbs and body parts as our own). However, little is known about how these areas implement the multisensory integration process at the computational level and whether activity predicts illusion elicitation in individual participants on a trial-by-trial basis. To address these questions, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and a rubber hand illusion-detection task and fitted the registered neural responses to a Bayesian causal inference model of body ownership. Thirty healthy human participants (male and female) performed 12 s trials with varying degrees of asynchronously delivered visual and tactile stimuli of a rubber hand (in view) and a (hidden) real hand. After the 12 s period, participants had to judge whether the rubber hand felt like their own. As hypothesized, activity in the premotor and posterior parietal cortices was related to illusion elicitation at the level of individual participants and trials. Importantly, activity in the posterior parietal cortex fit the predicted probability of illusion emergence of the Bayesian causal inference model based on each participant's behavioral response profile. Our findings suggest an important role for the posterior parietal cortex in implementing Bayesian causal inference of body ownership and reveal how trial-by-trial variations in neural signatures of multisensory integration relate to the elicitation of the rubber hand illusion. How does the brain create a coherent perceptual experience of one's own body based on information from the different senses? We examined how the likelihood of eliciting a classical bodily illusion that depends on vision and touch-the rubber hand illusion-is related to neural activity measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging. We found that trial-by-trial variations in the neural signal in the posterior parietal cortex, a well known center for sensory integration, fitted a statistical function that describes how likely it is that the brain infers that a rubber hand is one's own given the available visual and tactile evidence. Thus, probabilistic analysis of sensory information in the parietal lobe underlies our unitary sense of bodily self.
我们如何感知到视野中的手是否属于自己的身体?先前的研究表明,顶-枕区域的视觉和体感整合对于身体所有权的感觉(即对手臂和身体部位的多感觉感知为我们自己的)起着关键作用。然而,对于这些区域如何在计算水平上实施多感觉整合过程以及活动是否可以预测个体参与者在逐个试验的基础上引发幻觉,知之甚少。为了解决这些问题,我们使用了功能磁共振成像和橡胶手错觉检测任务,并将注册的神经反应拟合到身体所有权的贝叶斯因果推理模型中。30 名健康人类参与者(男性和女性)进行了 12 秒的试验,其中橡胶手(在视野中)和(隐藏的)真实手的视觉和触觉刺激以不同程度的异步方式提供。在 12 秒后,参与者必须判断橡胶手是否感觉像自己的手。正如假设的那样,运动前皮质和后顶叶皮质的活动与个体参与者和试验水平的错觉诱发有关。重要的是,后顶叶皮质的活动符合贝叶斯因果推理模型的预测概率,该模型基于每个参与者的行为反应特征来预测错觉的出现。我们的研究结果表明,后顶叶皮质在实施身体所有权的贝叶斯因果推理中起着重要作用,并揭示了多感觉整合的神经特征如何与橡胶手错觉的诱发相关。大脑如何基于来自不同感官的信息创建一个连贯的自身感知体验?我们检查了依赖于视觉和触觉的经典身体错觉(橡胶手错觉)的诱发可能性与功能磁共振成像测量的神经活动之间的关系。我们发现,后顶叶皮质的神经信号在每个试验中的变化都符合描述大脑在给定可用的视觉和触觉证据的情况下推断橡胶手是否属于自己的概率函数。因此,顶叶叶的感觉信息的概率分析是我们单一的身体自我意识的基础。