Unit of Food Microbiology, Institute of Food Safety, Food Technology and Veterinary Public Health, Department of Farm Animal and Public Health in Veterinary Medicine, University of Veterinary Medicine, 1210 Vienna, Austria.
The Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES), Department of Clinical Molecular Biology, Währingerstrasse 25a, 1096 Vienna, Austria.
Int J Food Microbiol. 2022 Oct 16;379:109844. doi: 10.1016/j.ijfoodmicro.2022.109844. Epub 2022 Jul 30.
In cases of outbreaks, food business operators face inspections, recall actions and delisting by retailers. This could have happened to an Austrian meat processor whose products have been associated with a cluster of seven cases of listeriosis spread over the years 2015-2017. Sequencing of clinical and foodborne isolates by public health specialists raised the suspect of a single source outbreak since all strains were of MLST 155, cgMLST 1234. Since the family-driven business was highly motivated to save their business, a crisis management scheme was applied that was agreed upon with national authorities. An end-product-based approach testing every single lot for L. monocytogenes was set into power and only negative lots were released for delivery. We combined the active food lot controls of food authorities with a Listeria environmental transmission mapping procedure. The environmental monitoring approach included 19 sampling activities during 3.5 years resulting in 1632 samples. This scheme allowed to trace and mitigate the Listeria contamination but did not jeopardize the processing of meat products. In total, 14 measures were set into power that reduced the overall Listeria occurrence after sanitation of 50-75 % (sampling event I, II) to 0.0-3.8 % (sampling events XIII to XIX). The outbreak-associated ST155/CT1234 clone was not detected in the third sampling event onwards but popped up during the sampling event VIII again. From then on, the outbreak clone ST155/CT1234 was no longer detected in the food business operator (FBO). We conclude that an intense combined investigation of food lots and environmental samples is needed to identify the source and verify that contamination levels are under control. Initially public health authorities suspected contamination of the slicer, but the monitoring approach has localized the source of ST155/CT1234 in a Schnitzel sorting machine. Other factors leading to the contamination scenario were inadequate conveyor belt hygiene. An inadequate crate washing system and an inadequate hygiene lock led to Listeria spreading between compartments. All transmission routes could be effectively interrupted. A root cause analysis and preventive maintenance program implemented in the FPE is mandatory for food processing facilities.
在疫情爆发的情况下,食品经营者将面临检查、召回行动和零售商下架等处罚。这可能发生在一家奥地利肉类加工商身上,其产品与 2015 年至 2017 年间发生的 7 例李斯特菌病聚集性病例有关。公共卫生专家对临床和食源性病原体进行测序后,怀疑这是一起单一来源的疫情爆发,因为所有菌株均为 MLST 155、cgMLST 1234。由于这家家族式企业非常有动力挽救他们的企业,因此应用了危机管理方案,并与国家当局达成一致。建立了基于终产品的方法,对每一批李斯特菌进行检测,只有阴性批次才放行交付。我们将食品当局的主动食品批次控制与李斯特菌环境传播映射程序相结合。环境监测方法包括在 3.5 年内进行 19 次采样活动,共采集了 1632 个样本。该方案允许追溯和减轻李斯特菌污染,但不会危及肉类加工。总共实施了 14 项措施,这些措施将总体李斯特菌发生率从卫生处理前的 50-75%(采样事件 I、II)降低到 0.0-3.8%(采样事件 XIII 至 XIX)。在第三次采样事件后,未检测到与疫情相关的 ST155/CT1234 克隆,但在第八次采样事件中再次出现。从那时起,食品经营者(FBO)中未再检测到疫情克隆 ST155/CT1234。我们得出结论,需要对食品批次和环境样本进行集中调查,以确定源头并验证污染水平得到控制。最初,公共卫生当局怀疑切片机受到污染,但监测方法已将 ST155/CT1234 的源头定位在绞肉机分拣机上。导致污染情况的其他因素是输送带卫生不彻底、清洗系统不完善、卫生锁不彻底,导致李斯特菌在隔室之间传播。所有传播途径都可以有效阻断。在食品加工厂实施根本原因分析和预防性维护计划对于食品安全至关重要。