Blau ByBenjamin M, Griffith Todd G, Whitby Ryan J
Department of Economics and Finance in , The Jon M. Huntsman School of Business at Utah State University, 3565 Old Main Hill, 84322 Logan, Utah USA.
Public Choice. 2022;192(3-4):377-397. doi: 10.1007/s11127-022-00991-5. Epub 2022 Sep 4.
Despite the unprecedented levels of liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve to banks during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, lending by banks slowed dramatically during and after that global episode. In this study, we propose that, given capital constraints, the lobbying expenditures by banks to combat Dodd-Frank might have crowded out lending activity. A variety of univariate and multivariate tests show that while lending by banks fell significantly around the financial crisis, lobbying rose dramatically. Our results also show that bank lobbying and lending are imperfect substitutes during non-crisis periods. Such substitutability likely is explained by the value perceived in the political connections gained through lobbying, such as the ability to influence regulation, preferential treatment on supervisory or enforcement decisions, and protection against adverse shocks in the form of government bailouts.
尽管在2007 - 2008年金融危机期间美联储向银行提供了前所未有的流动性，但在这场全球危机期间及之后，银行贷款大幅放缓。在本研究中，我们提出，鉴于资本约束，银行用于对抗《多德-弗兰克法案》的游说支出可能挤出了贷款活动。各种单变量和多变量检验表明，虽然在金融危机期间银行贷款显著下降，但游说活动却急剧增加。我们的结果还表明，在非危机时期，银行游说和贷款并非完全替代品。这种可替代性可能是由于通过游说获得的政治关系所带来的价值，比如影响监管的能力、在监管或执法决策上的优惠待遇以及以政府救助形式抵御不利冲击的保护。
