School of Psychology, 3660University of Surrey, Guildford, UK.
Perception. 2022 Dec;51(12):853-858. doi: 10.1177/03010066221127368. Epub 2022 Sep 21.
First, I agree with Cheng that the argument from illusions to indirect realism is controversial, especially as to what is meant by "realism," "veridical," and "sense data" and the background assumptions underlying them. I provide a finer specification of some of the sub-movements that were the specific concerns of my previous article, particularly phenomenology as it currently sees itself in perception research, and the relevance of illusions. Perception has turned out to be far more complex than traditional philosophy realized, as has been revealed by recent research in neuroscience and psychophysics. Lastly, I answer Cheng's question about the "causal exclusion argument" by suggesting it is obviated by the temporal substructure of metaphysical states, and I provide a detailed supporting case in Supplementary Material.
首先，我同意成的观点，即从幻觉到间接实在论的论证是有争议的，尤其是对于“实在论”、“真实性”和“感觉数据”以及它们所基于的背景假设的含义。我对我之前文章中一些具体关注点的一些子步骤进行了更详细的说明，特别是在知觉研究中当前的现象学以及幻觉的相关性。知觉比传统哲学所认识到的要复杂得多，这一点已经被最近神经科学和心理物理学的研究揭示出来了。最后，我通过暗示形而上学状态的时间子结构排除了“因果排除论证”来回答成的问题，并在补充材料中提供了一个详细的支持案例。
