34913National Chengchi University, Taipei.
Perception. 2022 Dec;51(12):847-852. doi: 10.1177/03010066221127367. Epub 2022 Sep 21.
In the target article, David Rose makes an interesting and substantive case against a certain kind of sceptical view: "veridical perception is impossible in principle," combined with a certain version of anti-realism. He proceeds by first illustrating several ideas from George Orwell's seminal work, and then proposes that a certain kind of non-reductive, levelled emergentist metaphysics can help us respond to such scepticism. In this commentary, I join forces with Rose's case, but will point out that we need to take seriously two discussions in contemporary philosophy in order to make the realist case stronger: the argument from illusion and hallucination, and the causal exclusion argument. Only then do Rose and his allies can have a more satisfactory case for objectivity and realism.
在目标文章中，大卫·罗斯（David Rose）对一种特定的怀疑主义观点提出了一个有趣而实质性的反对意见：“从原则上讲，正确的感知是不可能的”，同时还结合了某种反现实主义观点。他首先通过举例说明乔治·奥威尔（George Orwell）的开创性著作中的几个观点，然后提出某种非还原性、平等的突现主义形而上学可以帮助我们应对这种怀疑主义。在这篇评论中，我与罗斯的观点站在同一立场，但我将指出，为了使现实主义观点更具说服力，我们需要认真对待当代哲学中的两个讨论：幻觉和错觉的论证，以及因果排除论证。只有这样，罗斯及其盟友才能为客观性和现实主义提供更令人满意的论据。
