German Centre for Integrative Biodiversity Research (iDiv) Halle-Jena-Leipzig, Puschstrasse 4, 04103, Leipzig, Germany.
Institute for Food and Resource Economics, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany.
Nat Commun. 2022 Oct 1;13(1):5759. doi: 10.1038/s41467-022-33398-3.
Many tropical forestlands are experiencing changes in land-tenure regimes, but how these changes may affect deforestation rates remains ambiguous. Here, we use Brazil's land-tenure and deforestation data and quasi-experimental methods to analyze how six land-tenure regimes (undesignated/untitled, private, strictly-protected and sustainable-use protected areas, indigenous, and quilombola lands) affect deforestation across 49 spatiotemporal scales. We find that undesignated/untitled public regimes with poorly defined tenure rights increase deforestation relative to any alternative regime in most contexts. The privatization of these undesignated/untitled lands often reduces this deforestation, particularly when private regimes are subject to strict environmental regulations such as the Forest Code in Amazonia. However, private regimes decrease deforestation less effectively and less reliably than alternative well-defined regimes, and directly privatizing either conservation regimes or indigenous lands would most likely increase deforestation. This study informs the ongoing political debate around land privatization/protection in tropical landscapes and can be used to envisage policy aligned with sustainable development goals.
许多热带森林地区正在经历土地保有权制度的变化,但这些变化如何影响森林砍伐率仍不清楚。在这里,我们使用巴西的土地保有权和森林砍伐数据以及准实验方法,分析了六种土地保有权制度(无指定/无标题、私人、严格保护和可持续利用保护区、土著和 quilombola 土地)如何在 49 个时空尺度上影响森林砍伐。我们发现,在大多数情况下,与任何替代制度相比,无指定/无标题的公共制度中权利界定不清的土地会增加森林砍伐。这些无指定/无标题土地的私有化通常会减少这种森林砍伐,特别是当私人制度受到严格的环境法规(如亚马逊地区的森林法)的约束时。然而,私人制度减少森林砍伐的效果不如其他定义明确的制度有效和可靠,直接将保护制度或土著土地私有化很可能会增加森林砍伐。本研究为热带景观中正在进行的土地私有化/保护的政治辩论提供了信息,并可用于设想符合可持续发展目标的政策。