Birg Laura
Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum, Germany.
Health Econ. 2023 Feb;32(2):302-323. doi: 10.1002/hec.4621. Epub 2022 Nov 6.
I study the effect of a change in the mandatory manufacturer rebate and a price freeze on wholesale prices for pharmaceuticals on competition by parallel imports. First, I analyze the effect of a manufacturer rebate on competition by parallel imports in a two-country model. Second, I exploit a policy reform in Germany in 2010 that increased the manufacturer rebate by 10 percentage points. Using a data set with prescription drugs with competition from parallel imports, I estimate the effect of the change in the manufacturer rebate on competition by parallel imports. The model predicts that an increase in the manufacturer rebate increases the market share of parallel imports. The rebate decreases the manufacturer's revenues from domestic distribution. In response, the manufacturer lowers the wholesale price for a foreign distributor, resulting in a competitive advantage for and an increase in the market share of parallel imports. The estimation shows that the increase in the manufacturer rebate by 10 percentage points has increased the market share of parallel imports by approximately 18%-35% and has increased the number of importers by up to 17%.
我研究了强制制造商回扣的变化以及药品批发价格冻结对平行进口竞争的影响。首先，我在两国模型中分析了制造商回扣对平行进口竞争的影响。其次，我利用了2010年德国的一项政策改革，该改革将制造商回扣提高了10个百分点。使用一个包含存在平行进口竞争的处方药的数据集，我估计了制造商回扣变化对平行进口竞争的影响。该模型预测，制造商回扣的增加会提高平行进口的市场份额。回扣减少了制造商在国内分销的收入。作为回应，制造商降低了对外国经销商的批发价格，从而为平行进口带来竞争优势并使其市场份额增加。估计结果表明，制造商回扣提高10个百分点使平行进口的市场份额增加了约18% - 35%，并使进口商数量增加了多达17%。
