2020年新冠疫情期间的首席执行官兼任与公司绩效
CEO duality and firm performance during the 2020 coronavirus outbreak.
作者信息
Hassan M Kabir, Houston Reza, Karim M Sydul, Sabit Ahmed
机构信息
Department of Economics and Finance, College of Business Administration, University of New Orleans, USA.
Department of Finance and Insurance, Miller College of Business, Ball State University, USA.
出版信息
J Econ Asymmetries. 2023 Jun;27:e00278. doi: 10.1016/j.jeca.2022.e00278. Epub 2022 Nov 4.
Stewardship theory suggests that CEO duality can provide strong leadership and facilitate the development and coordination of firm strategy. These benefits should affect firm risk and financial performance, particularly when the firm has high information-gathering costs. We use the 2020 coronavirus outbreak as a natural experiment to determine whether CEO duality is beneficial during crisis periods. We find that in 2020, S&P 1500 firms with CEO duality exhibit smaller increases in default probability risk than firms with non-duality in the presence of high information costs. Firms with CEO duality experience a smaller decrease in profitability when information costs are high. We also find that firms with CEO duality offer cumulative abnormal returns significantly higher than those of other firms. CEO duality is more valuable in firms with higher information costs. Our results indicate that CEO duality is valuable during crisis periods, particularly when information costs are high. These results are consistent with stewardship theory and indicate that the concentration of power from CEO duality is beneficial during crisis periods.
管家理论认为，首席执行官兼任董事长可以提供强有力的领导，并促进公司战略的制定与协调。这些益处应该会影响公司风险和财务绩效，尤其是当公司的信息收集成本较高时。我们将2020年冠状病毒爆发作为一项自然实验，以确定首席执行官兼任董事长在危机时期是否有益。我们发现，在2020年，存在高信息成本时，与非兼任董事长的标准普尔1500家公司相比，首席执行官兼任董事长的公司违约概率风险增幅更小。当信息成本较高时，首席执行官兼任董事长的公司盈利能力下降幅度更小。我们还发现，首席执行官兼任董事长的公司提供的累计异常回报率显著高于其他公司。在信息成本较高的公司中，首席执行官兼任董事长更具价值。我们的结果表明，首席执行官兼任董事长在危机时期具有价值，尤其是当信息成本较高时。这些结果与管家理论一致，并表明危机时期首席执行官兼任董事长带来的权力集中是有益的。
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