Guardiola Joan González
Department of Philosophy and Social Work, University of the Balearic Islands (UIB), Palma, Spain.
Front Psychol. 2022 Dec 2;13:1069448. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1069448. eCollection 2022.
In the present work, we aim to make a contribution to the origins of the notion of "minimum self" in Husserl's phenomenology. Starting from the difference between the philosophy of the subject and the philosophy of the self, the aim of this research is to show that the Cartesian association between both philosophies would not exactly correspond to the conception of the self, as we find it in Edmund Husserl's works. With this, we intend to nuance Heidegger's accusation of Husserl's "Cartesianism," At the same time, we show how a detailed analysis of the "senses of the self" in Husserl's phenomenology allows extracting the notion of "minimal self" as it has been introduced in the current and lively debate between psychiatry and phenomenology. In our research, we also show that in order to move the theory of the transcendental ego toward the theory of the orientation of the life of consciousness, it is necessary to consider the foundation of the concepts of ego in the technical vocabulary of the formal mereology of the Husserl's third "Logical Investigation."
在本研究中，我们旨在为胡塞尔现象学中“最小自我”概念的起源做出贡献。从主体哲学与自我哲学之间的差异出发，本研究的目的是表明，笛卡尔将这两种哲学联系起来的做法并不完全符合我们在埃德蒙德·胡塞尔著作中所发现的自我概念。借此，我们意图对海德格尔对胡塞尔“笛卡尔主义”的指责进行细化。同时，我们展示了对胡塞尔现象学中“自我的意义”进行详细分析如何能够提炼出“最小自我”的概念，这一概念已在精神病学与现象学当前热烈的辩论中被引入。在我们的研究中，我们还表明，为了将先验自我理论转向意识生活的定向理论，有必要在胡塞尔《第三“逻辑研究”》形式分体论的技术词汇中考虑自我概念的基础。
