Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Getafe, Madrid, Spain.
Center for Bioethics, School of Global Public Health, New York University, New York, NY, United States of America.
PLoS One. 2022 Dec 27;17(12):e0275383. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0275383. eCollection 2022.
We study policies aimed at discouraging behavior that produces negative externalities, and their differential gender impact. Using driving as an application, we carry out an experiment where slowest vehicles are the safest choice, whereas faster driving speeds lead to higher potential payoffs but higher probabilities of accidents. Faster speeds have a personal benefit but create a negative externality. We consider four experimental policy conditions: a baseline situation, a framing condition in which drivers are suggested that driving fast violates a social norm, and two punishment conditions, one exogenous and one endogenous. We find that the most effective policies use different framing and endogenously determined punishment mechanisms (to fast drivers by other drivers). These policies are only effective for female drivers which leads to substantial gender payoff differences. Our data suggest that these results arise from differences in social norms across genders, thus opening the way to designing more effective policies.
我们研究旨在抑制产生负外部性的行为的政策及其对性别差异的影响。我们以驾驶为例，进行了一项实验，在该实验中，最慢的车辆是最安全的选择，而较快的驾驶速度则会带来更高的潜在收益，但发生事故的概率也更高。较快的速度带来个人收益，但会产生负外部性。我们考虑了四种实验政策条件：基准情况、一种暗示快速驾驶违反社会规范的框架条件，以及两种惩罚条件，一种是外生的，一种是内生的。我们发现，最有效的政策使用了不同的框架和内生的惩罚机制（由其他司机对超速司机进行惩罚）。这些政策仅对女性司机有效，这导致了巨大的性别收益差异。我们的数据表明，这些结果源于性别之间的社会规范差异，从而为设计更有效的政策开辟了道路。
