Long Jianjun, Huang Hui
School of Management Science and Engineering, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China.
School of Business, Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha 410128, China.
Math Biosci Eng. 2022 Sep 22;19(12):14056-14073. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2022654.
Bounded rationality, asymmetric information and spillover effects are widespread in the economic market, and had been studied extensively in oligopoly games, however, few literature discussed the incomplete information between bounded rational oligopolists in an enterprise cluster. Considering the positive externalities brought by the spillover effect between cluster enterprises, a duopoly Cournot-Bertrand game with bounded rationality and asymmetric information is proposed in this paper. In our model, firm 1 with an information advantage knows all the price information of firm 2 with an information advantage, while firm 2 only partially knows the output information of firm 1, and they adopt boundedly rational expectation and naïve expectation respectively. Interestingly, our theoretical analysis reveals that: (1) When the output adjustment speed of enterprises with information advantage is large or the substitutability between monopoly products is high, moderate effective information is beneficial to the stability of product market, while too low or too high effective information may lead to market disorder. (2) The relationship between cluster spillover and Nash equilibrium stability depends on product substitutability. When the substitutability is small, smaller cluster spillovers are more conducive to the stability of product output or price; when the substitutability is large, the larger the cluster spillover is, the more stable the product market is. Our research has an important theoretical and practical significance to the production-price competition in oligopoly markets.
有限理性、信息不对称和溢出效应在经济市场中广泛存在，并且在寡头博弈中已得到广泛研究，然而，很少有文献讨论企业集群中有限理性寡头之间的不完全信息。考虑到集群企业之间溢出效应带来的正外部性，本文提出了一个具有有限理性和信息不对称的双寡头古诺 - 伯特兰博弈模型。在我们的模型中，具有信息优势的企业1知道具有信息劣势的企业2的所有价格信息，而企业2仅部分知道企业1的产量信息，并且它们分别采用有限理性预期和幼稚预期。有趣的是，我们的理论分析表明：（1）当具有信息优势的企业的产量调整速度较大或垄断产品之间的替代性较高时，适度的有效信息有利于产品市场的稳定，而有效信息过低或过高可能导致市场混乱。（2）集群溢出与纳什均衡稳定性之间的关系取决于产品替代性。当替代性较小时，较小的集群溢出更有利于产品产量或价格的稳定；当替代性较大时，集群溢出越大，产品市场越稳定。我们的研究对寡头市场中的生产 - 价格竞争具有重要的理论和现实意义。
