van Buren Franziska
Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, België.
Apeiron. 2023 Jan 27;56(1):15-42. doi: 10.1515/apeiron-2021-0014. Epub 2021 Jul 8.
Scholars have long considered de Philosophia and de Caelo to be in contradiction regarding the nature of the heavenly bodies, particularly with respect to the activity proper to the element composing them. According to the accounts we have of de Philosophia, Aristotle seems to have put forth that stars move because they have minds, and, according to Cicero's account of the lost text, they choose their actions out of free will. In de Caelo, however, Aristotle seems only to consider that stars engage in the activity of circular motion because it is in their nature to do so, as it is in the nature of, e.g. fire to move upwards or Earth to move downwards. In this paper, I argue against the longstanding view that there is an incompatibility between these two "early" cosmological texts of Aristotle. I aim to show that these two texts endorse complementary, not contradictory, views of the heavenly bodies. I argue that in de Philosophia, Aristotle attributes to stars the intellective counterpart of the spatial motion which is developed in greater depth in de Caelo, while in de Caelo, we see hints of Aristotle's view in de Philosophia that the stars are also minds and are able to rationally cognize their particular good - a point which is shown in de Caelo 292a18-293a14, where Aristotle attributes both life and praxis to the heavenly bodies. The overarching view which I present of these two texts is that while de Caelo approaches the heavenly bodies qua bodies and de Philosophia approaches them qua minds, they are still examining one and the same substance and that Aristotle has not changed his mind regarding the basic nature of such a substance in the (supposed) interim between writing de Philosophia and de Caelo. Rather, we find echoes of de Caelo in de Philosophia, and echoes of de Philosophia in de Caelo, which speaks to the fact that Aristotle maintains one view of the heavenly bodies which he presents over the course of these two texts.
长期以来,学者们一直认为《论哲学》和《论天》在天体的本质问题上存在矛盾,尤其是在构成天体的元素所特有的活动方面。根据我们所掌握的关于《论哲学》的记载,亚里士多德似乎提出恒星运动是因为它们有心灵,而且,根据西塞罗对失传文本的记载,它们出于自由意志选择自己的行动。然而,在《论天》中,亚里士多德似乎只认为恒星进行圆周运动是因为这样做是它们的本性,就像例如火向上运动或土向下运动是其本性一样。在本文中,我反对长期以来认为亚里士多德这两篇 “早期” 宇宙学文本之间存在不相容性的观点。我的目的是表明这两篇文本支持的是关于天体的互补观点,而非相互矛盾的观点。我认为在《论哲学》中,亚里士多德赋予恒星的是在《论天》中更深入阐述的空间运动的理智对应物,而在《论天》中,我们可以看到亚里士多德在《论哲学》中的观点的一些暗示,即恒星也是心灵,并且能够理性地认识它们自身的特殊善 —— 这一点在《论天》292a18 - 293a14中有所体现,亚里士多德在那里赋予天体生命和实践能力。我对这两篇文本的总体看法是,虽然《论天》将天体作为物体来探讨,而《论哲学》将天体作为心灵来探讨,但它们仍然在研究同一个实体,而且在撰写《论哲学》和《论天》(假定的)间隔期间,亚里士多德对于这样一个实体的基本性质并没有改变他的想法。相反,我们在《论哲学》中能找到《论天》的影子,在《论天》中也能找到《论哲学》的影子,这表明亚里士多德在这两篇文本中对天体持一种连贯的观点。