National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia.
National Incident Centre, The Australian Government Department of Health, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia.
PLoS One. 2023 Feb 2;18(2):e0264294. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0264294. eCollection 2023.
We critically appraised the literature regarding in-flight transmission of a range of respiratory infections to provide an evidence base for public health policies for contact tracing passengers, given the limited pathogen-specific data for SARS-CoV-2 currently available. Using PubMed, Web of Science, and other databases including preprints, we systematically reviewed evidence of in-flight transmission of infectious respiratory illnesses. A meta-analysis was conducted where total numbers of persons on board a specific flight was known, to calculate a pooled Attack Rate (AR) for a range of pathogens. The quality of the evidence provided was assessed using a bias assessment tool developed for in-flight transmission investigations of influenza which was modelled on the PRISMA statement and the Newcastle-Ottawa scale. We identified 103 publications detailing 165 flight investigations. Overall, 43.7% (72/165) of investigations provided evidence for in-flight transmission. H1N1 influenza A virus had the highest reported pooled attack rate per 100 persons (AR = 1.17), followed by SARS-CoV-2 (AR = 0.54) and SARS-CoV (AR = 0.32), Mycobacterium tuberculosis (TB, AR = 0.25), and measles virus (AR = 0.09). There was high heterogeneity in estimates between studies, except for TB. Of the 72 investigations that provided evidence for in-flight transmission, 27 investigations were assessed as having a high level of evidence, 23 as medium, and 22 as low. One third of the investigations that reported on proximity of cases showed transmission occurring beyond the 2x2 seating area. We suggest that for emerging pathogens, in the absence of pathogen-specific evidence, the 2x2 system should not be used for contact tracing. Instead, alternate contact tracing protocols and close contact definitions for enclosed areas, such as the same cabin on an aircraft or other forms of transport, should be considered as part of a whole of journey approach.
我们批判性地评估了关于一系列呼吸道传染病在飞行中传播的文献,为目前有限的 SARS-CoV-2 病原体特异性数据提供了公共卫生政策制定的依据。使用 PubMed、Web of Science 和其他数据库,包括预印本,我们系统地回顾了传染性呼吸道疾病在飞行中传播的证据。对于特定航班上已知总人数的情况,我们进行了荟萃分析,以计算一系列病原体的总感染率(AR)。使用针对流感飞行传播调查开发的偏倚评估工具评估证据的质量,该工具是基于 PRISMA 声明和纽卡斯尔-渥太华量表建模的。我们确定了 103 篇详细描述 165 次飞行调查的出版物。总体而言,43.7%(72/165)的调查提供了飞行中传播的证据。甲型 H1N1 流感病毒的报告总感染率最高,每 100 人感染率为 1.17,其次是 SARS-CoV-2(感染率为 0.54)和 SARS-CoV(感染率为 0.32)、结核分枝杆菌(TB,感染率为 0.25)和麻疹病毒(感染率为 0.09)。除了 TB 之外,研究之间的估计值存在很大的异质性。在提供飞行中传播证据的 72 项调查中,有 27 项被评估为具有高度证据水平,23 项为中度证据水平,22 项为低度证据水平。三分之一的报告病例接近情况的调查显示,传播发生在 2x2 座位区域之外。我们建议,对于新出现的病原体,在缺乏病原体特异性证据的情况下,不应将 2x2 系统用于接触者追踪。相反,应考虑在封闭区域(如飞机上的同一客舱或其他形式的交通工具)使用替代接触者追踪协议和密切接触定义,作为整个行程方法的一部分。