Effects of shared governance and cost redistribution on air pollution control: a study of game theory-based cooperation.

This study seeks cost-effective strategies for PM2.5 reduction to generate insights into minimizing pollution abatement costs subject to different scenarios. This study theorizes that the cooperation of PM2.5 abatement has potential gains for participants and develop an empirical way to compare the costs and efficiency of PM2.5 abatement involving the variation of environmental conditions. This study revises the cooperative game model in the context of threshold effects using data obtained from the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan cluster in China. In general, the results support the key assertion that cooperation in the metropolitan cluster plays a vital role in optimizing the efficiency and costs of PM2.5 abatement. In addition to extending the application of the revised model, this study provides a way to estimate the costs and the mitigation benefits of meeting the pollution targets for each coparticipant and take the scenario of multiparty cooperation into account as well as the scenarios involving other types of pollutants. The empirical findings have important policy implications for regional shared governance, decentralization, and resource reallocation. Economic incentive-based shared governance and cost reallocation work better than traditional regulations.