Wagner Johannes M J, Pölzler Thomas, Wright Jennifer C
Department of Philosophy, University of Graz, Attemsgasse 25/II, 8010 Graz, Austria.
Department of Psychology, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC USA.
Rev Philos Psychol. 2023;14(1):1-31. doi: 10.1007/s13164-021-00572-3. Epub 2021 Nov 12.
Philosophical arguments often assume that the folk tends towards moral objectivism. Although recent psychological studies have indicated that lay persons' attitudes to morality are best characterized in terms of non-objectivism-leaning pluralism, it has been maintained that the folk may be committed to moral objectivism . Since the studies conducted so far almost exclusively assessed subjects' metaethical attitudes via explicit cognitions, the strength of this rebuttal remains unclear. The current study attempts to test the folk's implicit metaethical commitments. We present results of a newly developed Implicit Association Test (IAT) for metaethical attitudes which indicate that the folk generally tend towards moral non-objectivism on the implicit level as well. We discuss implications of this finding for the philosophical debate.
哲学论证常常假定普通人倾向于道德客观主义。尽管最近的心理学研究表明，外行人对道德的态度最好用倾向于非客观主义的多元论来描述，但有人坚持认为普通人可能认同道德客观主义。由于迄今为止进行的研究几乎完全通过显性认知来评估受试者的元伦理态度，这种反驳的力度仍不明确。当前的研究试图测试普通人隐含的元伦理认同。我们展示了一项新开发的关于元伦理态度的内隐联想测验（IAT）的结果，该结果表明，在隐含层面上，普通人总体上也倾向于道德非客观主义。我们讨论了这一发现对哲学辩论的影响。
