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通过政府污染控制和居民参与提高流域环境管理的有效性——动态协调

Improving the effectiveness of watershed environmental management-dynamic coordination through government pollution control and resident participation.

作者信息

Cheng Changgao, Fang Zhou, Zhou Qin, Wang Yingdi, Li Nan, Zhou Haiwei

机构信息

Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing, 211100, China.

Jiangsu Province "World Water Valley" and Water Ecological Civilization Collaborative Innovation Center, Nanjing, 211100, China.

出版信息

Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2023 Apr;30(20):57862-57881. doi: 10.1007/s11356-023-26328-3. Epub 2023 Mar 27.

DOI:10.1007/s11356-023-26328-3
PMID:36971944
Abstract

To improve the effectiveness of envir onmental management of watersheds and improve the environmental management mechanism of cross-administrative watersheds, we develop a neoliberal framework for action using incentives, examine the cooperative strategies of local governments in watershed treatment and people-oriented environmental protection under central government subsidies, and analyze the cost effectiveness of multiple strategies in a dynamic perspective, and we have the following important findings: (1) Compared to vertical ecological compensation, the introduction of horizontal cost-sharing contracts is more effective in enhancing inter-local cooperative environmental governance. (2) When the marginal benefit of the downstream local government is greater than half of the upstream marginal benefit, the upstream local government's pollution control investment and the effect of pollution control are improved, and the Pareto improvement of the environmental governance benefit of the watershed is realized, i.e., the cost-sharing contract driven by the downstream can achieve a win-win situation for both environmental and government governance benefits. (3) When the marginal benefit of downstream environmental advocacy is between 0.5 and 1.5 times the marginal benefit of upstream government, the cost-sharing contract is more effective in improving downstream benefits. Conversely, when the marginal benefit of downstream is greater than 1.5 times, the marginal benefit of upstream, the more effective the cost-sharing contract is in improving the marginal benefit of downstream. The results of the study provide useful insights for the government to develop reasonable pollution management cooperation mechanisms to improve environmental management performance and thus enhance the sustainable development of the watershed.

摘要

为提高流域环境管理成效,完善跨行政区流域环境管理机制,构建基于激励的新自由主义行动框架,考察中央财政补贴下地方政府在流域治理中的合作策略及以人为本的环境保护措施,从动态视角分析多种策略的成本效益,得到以下重要发现:(1)相较于纵向生态补偿,引入横向成本分担契约更有助于提升地方间合作环境治理成效。(2)当下游地方政府边际效益大于上游边际效益的一半时,上游地方政府污染治理投入及治理效果得以改善,流域环境治理效益实现帕累托改进,即下游驱动的成本分担契约可实现环境与政府治理效益双赢。(3)当下游环境宣传边际效益在上游政府边际效益的0.5至1.5倍之间时,成本分担契约对提升下游效益更有效;反之,当下游边际效益大于上游边际效益的1.5倍时,成本分担契约对提升下游边际效益更有效。研究结果为政府制定合理的污染管理合作机制以提升环境管理绩效进而增强流域可持续发展能力提供了有益参考。

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