Narveson J
Can J Psychiatry. 1986 Mar;31(2):104-7. doi: 10.1177/070674378603100205.
There are two main moral issues regarding suicide: first, whether suicide is morally permissible, and if so, in what circumstances; and second, whether a person who knows that someone is contemplating or attempting suicide has an obligation to intervene and if so, how strong that obligation is. With respect to the first issue, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that suicide is not wrong in itself. To characterize suicide as murder of one's self is incorrect. Even if people who commit suicide deprive the community of some good, there is no general duty to provide good services to others. Theological objections to suicide are not persuasive. And suicide could be rational. For example, if one's scheme of values is to maximize the overall value of experience, and if at some point in the future negative value outweighs positive value, suicide would be rationally indicated. With respect to intervention, different considerations apply to persons involved with someone contemplating or attempting suicide, professionals, and the general public. Those who are involved have their own lives to live and need not alter them even when another person's life is at stake. Professionals should not become paternalistic authorities who keep subjects alive against their will and miserable for indefinite periods. The general public has only a weak duty to save strangers from suicide.
第一，自杀在道德上是否被允许，如果是，在何种情况下；第二，一个知道有人正在考虑自杀或正在尝试自杀的人是否有干预的义务，如果有，这种义务有多强烈。关于第一个问题，很难不得出自杀本身并非错误的结论。将自杀描述为自我谋杀是不正确的。即使自杀的人剥夺了社会的某些益处，但并没有向他人提供良好服务的普遍义务。对自杀的神学反对意见并不具有说服力。而且自杀可能是理性的。例如，如果一个人的价值观体系是使体验的总体价值最大化，并且如果在未来的某个时刻负面价值超过正面价值，那么自杀将在理性上被表明是合理的。关于干预，不同的考虑适用于与考虑自杀或尝试自杀的人有关的人、专业人员和普通公众。那些与之相关的人有自己的生活要过，即使另一个人的生命危在旦夕，他们也无需改变自己的生活。专业人员不应成为违背他人意愿让其存活且长期处于痛苦之中的家长式权威。普通公众只有微弱的义务去拯救陌生人免于自杀。
