Hereth Blake
University of Massachusetts Lowell, 883 Broadway St., Dugan Hall 200L, MA, 01852, Lowell, USA.
J Bioeth Inq. 2023 Sep;20(3):397-408. doi: 10.1007/s11673-023-10234-x. Epub 2023 Apr 3.
I defend two collapsing or reductionist arguments against weak pro-natalism (WPN), the view that procreation is generally merely permissible. In particular, I argue that WPN collapses into strong pro-natalism (SPN), the view that procreation is generally obligatory. Because SPN conflicts with the dominant view that procreation is never obligatory, demonstrating that WPN collapses into or entails SPN establishes epistemic parity (at least as concerns reproductive liberty) between WPN and anti-natalism (AN), the view that procreation is always impermissible. First, I distinguish between two moral goods: the good of procreation itself and the good of procreative potential. Second, I contend that the average moral agent is obligated to assist needy children via adoption, fostering, or other financial or interpersonal support. Third, I present the first collapsing argument: if an agent's justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources (financial or interpersonal) for their actual future offspring, that justification is preserved only if they eventually and actually procreate. Thus, their eventual procreation is morally obligatory and SPN follows. Fourth, I present the second collapsing argument, which assumes procreative potential as the relevant good: if an agent's justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources for their potential future offspring, that justification holds only if (a) the objective or subjective valuation of the opportunity is of the relevant type and valence to justify not assisting needy children and (b) the agent sincerely values the opportunity. Fifth, I argue that (a) is unsatisfied and that while (b) is satisfied in most cases, it entails that most agents are obligated to desire or be behaviourally disposed to pursue procreation for themselves (i.e., SPN). Thus, I conclude that both actual procreation and procreative potential are either insufficient justifications for not assisting needy children or that they entail obligatory pro-reproductive attitudes or behaviours.
我为两种反对温和生育主义（WPN）的归约或还原论观点进行辩护，温和生育主义是指生育通常仅仅是被允许的观点。具体而言，我认为温和生育主义会归约为强硬生育主义（SPN），即生育通常是义务性的观点。由于强硬生育主义与生育绝不是义务性的主流观点相冲突，证明温和生育主义会归约为或蕴含强硬生育主义，就在温和生育主义与反生育主义（AN）之间建立了认知对等（至少在生殖自由方面），反生育主义认为生育总是不被允许的。首先，我区分了两种道德善：生育本身的善和生育潜力的善。其次，我主张普通道德主体有义务通过收养、寄养或其他经济或人际支持来帮助贫困儿童。第三，我提出第一个归约论证：如果一个主体不帮助贫困儿童的理由是为其实际的未来后代保留资源（经济或人际方面的），那么只有当他们最终实际生育时，这个理由才成立。因此，他们最终的生育在道德上是义务性的，强硬生育主义随之而来。第四，我提出第二个归约论证，该论证将生育潜力视为相关的善：如果一个主体不帮助贫困儿童的理由是为其潜在的未来后代保留资源，那么只有当（a）对该机会的客观或主观评价具有与不帮助贫困儿童相称的相关类型和效价，并且（b）该主体真诚地重视该机会时，这个理由才成立。第五，我认为（a）不成立，并且虽然（b）在大多数情况下成立，但这意味着大多数主体有义务渴望或在行为上倾向于为自己追求生育（即强硬生育主义）。因此，我得出结论，实际生育和生育潜力要么都不是不帮助贫困儿童的充分理由，要么它们都蕴含义务性的支持生育的态度或行为。
