Library Services, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom.
J Med Philos. 2023 Apr 20;48(2):170-183. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhad001.
In recent years the phenomenological approach to bioethics has been rejuvenated and reformulated by, among others, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus. Building on the now-relatively mainstream phenomenological approach to health and illness, Svenaeus has sought to bring phenomenological insights to bear on the bioethical enterprise, with a view to critiquing and refining the "philosophical anthropology" presupposed by the latter. This article offers a critical but sympathetic analysis of Svenaeus' efforts, focusing on both his conception of the ends of phenomenological bioethics and the predominantly Heideggerian means he employs. Doing so reveals certain problems with both. I argue that the main aim of phenomenological bioethics as set out by Svenaeus needs to be reformulated, and that there are important oversights in his approach to reaching this end. I conclude by arguing that to overcome the latter problem we should draw instead on the works of Max Scheler and Hans Jonas.
近年来，现象学方法在生物伦理学中得到了复兴和重新构建，其中包括瑞典哲学家弗雷德里克·斯文尼斯（Fredrik Svenaeus）。斯文尼斯以现在相对主流的健康和疾病现象学方法为基础，试图将现象学的洞见应用于生物伦理事业，以批判和完善后者所预设的“哲学人类学”。本文对斯文尼斯的努力进行了批判性但富有同情心的分析，重点关注他对现象学生物伦理学目的的理解以及他主要使用的海德格尔式方法。这样做揭示了两者都存在的某些问题。我认为，需要重新构建斯文尼斯所提出的现象学生物伦理学的主要目标，并且他在实现这一目标的方法上存在重要的疏忽。最后，我认为，为了克服后者的问题，我们应该转而借鉴马克斯·舍勒（Max Scheler）和汉斯·约纳斯（Hans Jonas）的作品。
