Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland.
J Med Philos. 2023 Sep 14;48(5):504-518. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhad018.
The mainstream concept of death-the biological one-identifies death with the cessation of an organism. In this article, I challenge the mainstream position, showing that there is no single well-established concept of an organism and no universal concept of death in biological terms. Moreover, some of the biological views on death, if applied in the context of bedside decisions, might imply unacceptable consequences. I argue the moral concept of death-one similar to that of Robert Veatch-overcomes such difficulties. The moral view identifies death with the irreversible cessation of a patient's moral status, that is, a state when she can no longer be harmed or wronged. The death of a patient takes place when she is no longer capable of regaining her consciousness. In this regard, the proposal elaborated herein resembles that of Veatch yet differs from Veatch's original project since it is universal. In essence, it is applicable in the case of other living beings such as animals and plants, provided that they have some moral status.
主流的死亡概念——生物学概念——将死亡与生物体的停止联系在一起。在本文中,我挑战主流观点,表明在生物学意义上,没有一个单一的、确立良好的生物体概念,也没有普遍的死亡概念。此外,如果将一些关于死亡的生物学观点应用于床边决策的背景下,可能会带来不可接受的后果。我认为,道德死亡概念——类似于罗伯特·维特的观点——可以克服这些困难。道德观点将死亡与患者道德地位的不可逆转停止联系起来,也就是说,当她不能再受到伤害或侵犯时的一种状态。当患者无法恢复意识时,她就死亡了。在这方面,本文所阐述的建议类似于维特的观点,但与维特的原始项目不同,因为它是普遍适用的。从本质上讲,只要其他生物(如动物和植物)具有一定的道德地位,它就适用于这些生物。