Albany Medical College, Albany, New York, USA.
Department of Philosophy, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA.
Bioethics. 2023 Jul;37(6):575-580. doi: 10.1111/bioe.13164. Epub 2023 May 6.
In 2011, bioethicists turned their attention to the question of whether prisoners on death row ought to be allowed to be organ donors. The discussion began with a provocative anti-procurement article by Arthur Caplan and prompted responses from an impressive lineup of commentators. In the 10 years since, the situation for death-row inmates seeking to donate has hardly changed: U.S. prison authorities consistently refuse to allow death-row procurement. We believe that it is time to revisit the issue. While Caplan's commentators rebutted his narrow contention that organ procurement would undermine the goals of deterrence and retribution, none of them attempted to make a positive, nonconsequentialist case for organ donation as a right of death-row inmates. That is the task we take up in this paper. After sketching and briefly defending a theory of punishment, we show how denial of organ donation is inconsistent with punishment's basic logic.
2011 年，生物伦理学家将注意力转向死刑犯是否应该被允许成为器官捐献者的问题。这场讨论始于亚瑟·卡普兰（Arthur Caplan）一篇颇具争议性的反器官获取文章，并引发了一大批评论员的回应。自那以后的 10 年里，死刑犯寻求捐赠器官的情况几乎没有改变：美国监狱当局一直拒绝允许从死刑犯身上获取器官。我们认为，现在是重新审视这个问题的时候了。虽然卡普兰的评论员反驳了他关于器官获取会破坏威慑和报复目标的狭隘论点，但他们都没有试图从积极的、非后果主义的角度为死刑犯的器官捐赠权提出正面论点。这就是我们在本文中要探讨的任务。在简述和简要捍卫了一种惩罚理论之后，我们展示了拒绝器官捐赠如何与惩罚的基本逻辑不一致。
