Johnson Jane
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia.
Macquarie University Research Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia.
Animals (Basel). 2023 Apr 27;13(9):1491. doi: 10.3390/ani13091491.
Increasingly, ethical concepts ordinarily reserved for the human research setting have been applied to nonhuman animals in research. This comes at the same time as concerns mount over challenges in translating the results of biomedical research with animals to human clinical benefit. This paper argues that applying the concept of dissent derived from research with humans to the context of animals can help to address a number of these translational issues, thereby providing an epistemological reason to take animal dissent seriously. This epistemological rationale can be added to the practical and ethical reasons for attending to animal dissent. Having made a case for recognizing the dissent of animals in biomedical research, the consequences that follow from this for the conduct of research are discussed. If animal researchers attend to dissent, then it seems that there are three types of strategy available: to override dissent, to train animals in such a way as to circumvent potential dissent, or to alter how research is conducted in order to be responsive to dissent. Only this last option has the potential to address all the types of reasons that motivate us to take dissent seriously; however, this would involve a significant reshaping of the practice of animal research.
通常用于人类研究环境的伦理概念越来越多地被应用于动物研究中。与此同时，人们越来越担心将动物生物医学研究结果转化为人类临床益处面临诸多挑战。本文认为，将源自人类研究的异议概念应用于动物研究背景，有助于解决其中一些转化问题，从而为认真对待动物异议提供一个认识论上的理由。这个认识论上的基本原理可以补充到关注动物异议的实践和伦理理由中。在论证了在生物医学研究中承认动物异议的合理性之后，本文讨论了这对研究行为的影响。如果动物研究人员关注异议，那么似乎有三种策略可供选择：无视异议、以规避潜在异议的方式训练动物，或者改变研究方式以回应异议。只有最后一种选择有可能解决促使我们认真对待异议的所有类型的理由；然而，这将涉及对动物研究实践的重大重塑。
