Cepparulo Alessandra, Eusepi Giuseppe, Giuriato Luisa
Sapienza University of Rome, via Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161 Rome, Italy.
Comp Econ Stud. 2023 Feb 27:1-23. doi: 10.1057/s41294-023-00213-x.
We explore the distribution of public-private partnerships (PPPs) among the European Union countries, with a special focus on fiscal rules and budgetary constraints while controlling for empirically identified drivers. While offering the opportunity to increase innovation and efficiency in the public sector infrastructure, PPPs allow governments to relax their budget and borrowing constraints. We find that the state of public finances influences the government's choice of PPPs and makes them more appealing for reasons other than efficiency. Stringent numerical rules on the budget balance also foster government's opportunism in the choice of PPPs. On the other hand, high levels of public debt increase the country risk, and discourage private investors from PPP contracts. The results highlight the importance of restoring PPP investment choices based on efficiency criteria and adapt fiscal rules to shield public investment while stabilizing private expectations by means of credible trajectories of debt reduction. The findings contribute to the debate on the role of fiscal rules in fiscal policy and of PPPs in infrastructure financing.
我们探讨了公私伙伴关系（PPPs）在欧盟国家中的分布情况，特别关注财政规则和预算限制，同时控制经验确定的驱动因素。公私伙伴关系在为公共部门基础设施提高创新和效率提供机会的同时，也使政府能够放宽其预算和借款限制。我们发现，公共财政状况会影响政府对公私伙伴关系的选择，并使其因效率以外的原因而更具吸引力。关于预算平衡的严格数字规则也助长了政府在公私伙伴关系选择上的机会主义。另一方面，高水平的公共债务会增加国家风险，并阻碍私人投资者参与公私伙伴关系合同。研究结果凸显了基于效率标准恢复公私伙伴关系投资选择以及调整财政规则以保护公共投资的重要性，同时通过可信的债务削减轨迹稳定私人预期。这些发现有助于关于财政规则在财政政策中的作用以及公私伙伴关系在基础设施融资中的作用的辩论。
