Dong Changqi, Liu Jida, Mi Jianing
School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China.
Healthcare (Basel). 2023 Jul 13;11(14):2019. doi: 10.3390/healthcare11142019.
The fragmentation and uneven quality of primary medical resources in China call for a deepening of integrated healthcare reform. China is promoting its county medical community (CMC) reform on a large scale in county-level administrative regions to promote the integration of local primary healthcare systems through information technology, which is consistent with the current trend of the digital governance era. Considering that the construction of a county medical community involves collaborative relationships between multi-level subjects, the evolutionary game theory was adopted in this study to construct a game model between the lead hospital of a CMC and primary healthcare institutions, and then the incentives of government department support were introduced to analyze the behavioral evolution of these three subjects. Taking into account the uncertainty of the real-life environment and information transformation, white Gaussian noise was introduced as a random disturbance term, and a numerical simulation was performed. In the two-subject model we focus on four parameters: information and management authority ceded by the primary healthcare institutions, integration coefficient of CMC information construction, intensity factor of information integration in the CMC, and medical resources delivered by the lead hospital. In the three-subject model we focus on three parameters: information and portion of authority ceded by the primary healthcare institutions and government departments, policy effect coefficient of CMC construction, and intensity of government departments' support for CMC construction. The simulation results show that there is a positive incentive for the concession of management power and information from the primary healthcare institutions to the lead hospital, but further determination of empowerment boundaries is needed. The lead hospital can improve the balance of medical resources in the county through the downward transfer of medical resources, but long-term resource delivery may inhibit the enthusiasm of the lead hospital. An improvement in the information integration intensity of the CMC can promote the efficient flow of information and knowledge and enhance the organizational closeness of the county medical community. At the same time, the integration of CMC information construction reduces the cost of collaboration among medical community members and streamlines and consolidates business modules, which can promote more efficient use of medical resources. The government departments' policies and funds provide obvious incentives to the lead hospital and primary healthcare institutions, but there is a need to explore appropriate financial payment ratios to balance the government's financial pressure.
中国基层医疗资源的碎片化和质量参差不齐,这就需要深化综合医疗改革。中国正在县级行政区大规模推进县域医共体(CMC)改革,通过信息技术促进当地基层医疗体系的整合,这与数字治理时代的当前趋势是一致的。考虑到县域医共体建设涉及多级主体之间的协作关系,本研究采用演化博弈理论构建了县域医共体牵头医院与基层医疗机构之间的博弈模型,然后引入政府部门支持的激励因素,分析这三个主体的行为演化。考虑到现实生活环境和信息转换的不确定性,引入白高斯噪声作为随机干扰项,并进行了数值模拟。在双主体模型中,我们关注四个参数:基层医疗机构让渡的信息与管理权限、县域医共体信息化建设的整合系数、县域医共体信息整合的强度因子以及牵头医院输送的医疗资源。在三主体模型中,我们关注三个参数:基层医疗机构和政府部门让渡的信息与权限比例、县域医共体建设的政策效应系数以及政府部门对县域医共体建设的支持力度。模拟结果表明,基层医疗机构向牵头医院让渡管理权和信息存在积极激励,但需要进一步确定赋权边界。牵头医院可以通过向下输送医疗资源来改善县域内医疗资源的均衡,但长期的资源输送可能会抑制牵头医院的积极性。县域医共体信息整合强度的提高可以促进信息和知识的高效流动,增强县域医共体的组织紧密性。同时,县域医共体信息化建设的整合降低了医共体成员间的协作成本,精简和整合了业务模块,能够促进医疗资源更高效利用。政府部门的政策和资金对牵头医院和基层医疗机构有明显激励作用,但需要探索合适的财政支付比例以平衡政府的财政压力。