• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利：CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法，用中文像聊天一样搜索，搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐，让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版，准确专业，支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式，支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述，25分钟生成高质量综述，智能提取关键信息，辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

基于物理不可克隆函数的物联网设备认证与密钥交换协议的安全性

On the Security of a PUF-Based Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for IoT Devices.

作者信息

Sun Da-Zhi, Gao Yi-Na, Tian Yangguang

机构信息

Tianjin Key Laboratory of Advanced Networking (TANK), College of Intelligence and Computing, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300350, China.

Department of Computer Science, University of Surrey, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK.

出版信息

Sensors (Basel). 2023 Jul 20;23(14):6559. doi: 10.3390/s23146559.

DOI:10.3390/s23146559
PMID:37514853
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10383870/
Abstract

Recently, Roy et al. proposed a physically unclonable function (PUF)-based authentication and key exchange protocol for Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The PUF protocol is efficient, because it integrates both the Node-to-Node (N2N) authentication and the Node-to-Server (N2S) authentication into a standalone protocol. In this paper, we therefore examine the security of the PUF protocol under the assumption of an insider attack. Our cryptanalysis findings are the following. (1) A legitimate but malicious IoT node can monitor the secure communication among the server and any other IoT nodes in both N2N authentication and N2S authentication. (2) A legitimate but malicious IoT node is able to impersonate a target IoT node to cheat the server and any other IoT nodes in N2N authentication and the server in N2S authentication, respectively. (3) A legitimate but malicious IoT node can masquerade as the server to cheat any other target IoT nodes in both N2N authentication and N2S authentication. To the best of our knowledge, our work gives the first non-trivial concrete security analysis for the PUF protocol. In addition, we employ the automatic verification tool of security protocols, i.e., Scyther, to confirm the weaknesses found in the PUF protocol. We finally consider how to prevent weaknesses in the PUF protocol.

摘要

最近，罗伊等人提出了一种基于物理不可克隆函数（PUF）的物联网（IoT）设备认证和密钥交换协议。该PUF协议效率很高，因为它将节点到节点（N2N）认证和节点到服务器（N2S）认证集成到了一个独立协议中。因此，在本文中，我们在内部人员攻击的假设下研究了PUF协议的安全性。我们的密码分析结果如下：（1）一个合法但恶意的物联网节点可以在N2N认证和N2S认证中监控服务器与任何其他物联网节点之间的安全通信。（2）一个合法但恶意的物联网节点能够分别在N2N认证中冒充目标物联网节点欺骗服务器和任何其他物联网节点，在N2S认证中欺骗服务器。（3）一个合法但恶意的物联网节点可以在N2N认证和N2S认证中伪装成服务器欺骗任何其他目标物联网节点。据我们所知，我们的工作首次对PUF协议进行了重要的具体安全性分析。此外，我们使用安全协议自动验证工具Scyther来确认在PUF协议中发现的弱点。我们最后考虑如何防止PUF协议中的弱点。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/5081a9ec6140/sensors-23-06559-g010.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/f76a61eeb87b/sensors-23-06559-g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/a353dc092de1/sensors-23-06559-g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/ac6ec731d108/sensors-23-06559-g003.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/2fcbcdd4c2a5/sensors-23-06559-g004.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/cef019751599/sensors-23-06559-g005.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/3a50e6adc82f/sensors-23-06559-g006.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/fef04584d32d/sensors-23-06559-g007.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/34d3c5a97867/sensors-23-06559-g008.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/71697c786710/sensors-23-06559-g009.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/5081a9ec6140/sensors-23-06559-g010.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/f76a61eeb87b/sensors-23-06559-g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/a353dc092de1/sensors-23-06559-g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/ac6ec731d108/sensors-23-06559-g003.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/2fcbcdd4c2a5/sensors-23-06559-g004.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/cef019751599/sensors-23-06559-g005.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/3a50e6adc82f/sensors-23-06559-g006.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/fef04584d32d/sensors-23-06559-g007.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/34d3c5a97867/sensors-23-06559-g008.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/71697c786710/sensors-23-06559-g009.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/8bd0/10383870/5081a9ec6140/sensors-23-06559-g010.jpg

相似文献

1
On the Security of a PUF-Based Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for IoT Devices.基于物理不可克隆函数的物联网设备认证与密钥交换协议的安全性
Sensors (Basel). 2023 Jul 20;23(14):6559. doi: 10.3390/s23146559.
2
IoT Device Security: Challenging "A Lightweight RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol Based on Physical Unclonable Function".物联网设备安全：挑战“基于物理不可克隆函数的轻量级 RFID 相互认证协议”。
Sensors (Basel). 2018 Dec 15;18(12):4444. doi: 10.3390/s18124444.
3
Designing secure PUF-based authentication protocols for constrained environments.为受限环境设计基于物理不可克隆函数的安全认证协议。
Sci Rep. 2023 Dec 7;13(1):21702. doi: 10.1038/s41598-023-48464-z.
4
PUFTAP-IoT: PUF-Based Three-Factor Authentication Protocol in IoT Environment Focused on Sensing Devices.PUFTAP-IoT：物联网环境中基于 PUF 的三因素认证协议，重点关注感测设备。
Sensors (Basel). 2022 Sep 19;22(18):7075. doi: 10.3390/s22187075.
5
Secure Three-Factor Authentication Protocol for Multi-Gateway IoT Environments.用于多网关物联网环境的安全三因素认证协议
Sensors (Basel). 2019 May 22;19(10):2358. doi: 10.3390/s19102358.
6
iAKA-CIoT: An Improved Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme for Cloud Enabled Internet of Things Using Physical Unclonable Function.iAKA-CIoT：一种使用物理不可克隆功能的改进型云物联网认证与密钥协商方案
Sensors (Basel). 2022 Aug 20;22(16):6264. doi: 10.3390/s22166264.
7
Reconfigurable Security Architecture (RESA) Based on PUF for FPGA-Based IoT Devices.基于PUF的面向基于FPGA的物联网设备的可重构安全架构（RESA）
Sensors (Basel). 2022 Jul 26;22(15):5577. doi: 10.3390/s22155577.
8
Provably Secure Lightweight Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme for Cloud-Based IoT Environments.面向基于云的物联网环境的可证明安全的轻量级相互认证与密钥协商方案。
Sensors (Basel). 2023 Dec 11;23(24):9766. doi: 10.3390/s23249766.
9
Physical Unclonable Function and Hashing Are All You Need to Mutually Authenticate IoT Devices.物理不可克隆函数和散列是相互认证物联网设备所需的全部。
Sensors (Basel). 2020 Aug 5;20(16):4361. doi: 10.3390/s20164361.
10
Securing the IoT-enabled smart healthcare system: A PUF-based resource-efficient authentication mechanism.保障支持物联网的智能医疗系统安全：一种基于物理不可克隆函数的资源高效认证机制。
Heliyon. 2024 Sep 10;10(18):e37577. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e37577. eCollection 2024 Sep 30.

引用本文的文献

1
A lightweight and secure authentication and privacy protection scheme for internet of medical things.一种用于医疗物联网的轻量级安全认证与隐私保护方案。
Sci Rep. 2025 Jul 4;15(1):23876. doi: 10.1038/s41598-025-05910-4.
2
A Study of the Optimal Logic Combinations of RO-Based PUFs on FPGAs to Maximize Identifiability.基于FPGA的基于RO的PUF的最优逻辑组合以最大化可识别性的研究。
Sensors (Basel). 2024 Dec 4;24(23):7747. doi: 10.3390/s24237747.
3
A Response-Feedback-Based Strong PUF with Improved Strict Avalanche Criterion and Reliability.

本文引用的文献

1
P/Key: PUF based second factor authentication.P/Key：基于 PUF 的第二因子认证。
PLoS One. 2023 Feb 9;18(2):e0280181. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0280181. eCollection 2023.
2
iAKA-CIoT: An Improved Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme for Cloud Enabled Internet of Things Using Physical Unclonable Function.iAKA-CIoT：一种使用物理不可克隆功能的改进型云物联网认证与密钥协商方案
Sensors (Basel). 2022 Aug 20;22(16):6264. doi: 10.3390/s22166264.
3
Physical Unclonable Function and Hashing Are All You Need to Mutually Authenticate IoT Devices.
一种基于响应反馈的强PUF，具有改进的严格雪崩准则和可靠性。
Sensors (Basel). 2023 Dec 23;24(1):93. doi: 10.3390/s24010093.
物理不可克隆函数和散列是相互认证物联网设备所需的全部。
Sensors (Basel). 2020 Aug 5;20(16):4361. doi: 10.3390/s20164361.