Barrera-Osorio Felipe, Linden Leigh L, Saavedra Juan E
Harvard Graduate School of Education, 456 Gutman Library, 6 Appian Way, Cambridge, MA 02138.
Department of Economics, The University of Texas at Austin, 2225 Speedway, Austin, TX 78712, BREAD, IPA, IZA, J-PAL, and NBER.
Am Econ J Appl Econ. 2019 Jul;11(3):54-91. doi: 10.1257/app.20170008.
In 2005 the city of Bogota, Colombia, introduced three conditional cash transfer programs for secondary schooling, randomly assigning socioeconomically disadvantaged students to different payment structures. We show, through administrative data, that forcing families to save one-third of the transfer increases long-term human capital accumulation by means of additional tertiary education-which is not incentivized-, casting doubt on conditionalities as a driving mechanism. Directly incentivizing on-time tertiary enrollment does no better than forcing families to save a portion of the transfer Whereas forcing families to save increases enrollment in four-year universities, incentivizing tertiary enrollment only increases enrollment in low-quality colleges.
2005年，哥伦比亚波哥大市针对中等教育推出了三项有条件现金转移支付计划，将社会经济条件不利的学生随机分配到不同的支付结构中。通过行政数据我们发现，迫使家庭将转移支付的三分之一储蓄起来，会通过增加高等教育（这并未得到激励）来促进长期人力资本积累，这让人对条件性作为一种驱动机制产生怀疑。直接激励按时接受高等教育并不比迫使家庭储蓄部分转移支付效果更好。虽然迫使家庭储蓄会增加进入四年制大学的入学率，但激励高等教育入学仅会增加进入低质量学院的入学率。
