Financial Department, Linyi University, Linyi, China.
School of Economics and Management, Qingdao Agricultural University, Qingdao, China.
PLoS One. 2023 Sep 12;18(9):e0291517. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0291517. eCollection 2023.
This paper aims to examine the impact of executive compensation incentive on corporate innovation capability by dividing executive compensation incentive into short-term monetary incentive and long-term equity incentive. We also investigate the interaction between the two types of executive compensation incentive. Data are collected from China's agro-based companies during 2012-2019, and multiple regression analysis is utilized. The empirical results show that short-term monetary incentive has no impact on innovation capability, while long-term equity incentive stimulates innovation capability. Regarding company ownership, the impact of long-term equity incentive in state-owned enterprises is greater than that in private-owned enterprises. In addition, the complementary effect between short-term and long-term compensation incentive has a positive impact on innovation capability regardless of company ownership. The findings of this paper could help agribusiness managers to design the reasonable incentive system to incentivize corporate executives and enhance the capability of independent innovation.
本文旨在通过将高管薪酬激励分为短期货币激励和长期股权激励，来考察高管薪酬激励对企业创新能力的影响。我们还研究了这两种类型的高管薪酬激励之间的相互作用。数据来自于 2012 年至 2019 年期间的中国农业企业，采用多元回归分析。实证结果表明，短期货币激励对创新能力没有影响，而长期股权激励则刺激了创新能力。关于公司所有权，国有企业中长期股权激励的影响大于私营企业。此外，无论公司所有权如何，短期和长期薪酬激励的互补效应都对创新能力有积极影响。本文的研究结果可以帮助农业企业管理者设计合理的激励制度来激励企业高管，提高企业的自主创新能力。
