Xu Chaohui, Zhang Haikuan, Wang Mansi, Iqbal Amir
School of Economics and Management, Hubei University of Science and Technology, Xianning, China.
School of Management, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou, China.
Front Psychol. 2022 Mar 4;12:810294. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.810294. eCollection 2021.
The current study examines the relationship between financialization, managers' incentives, and the enterprise's innovation. Based on the principal-agent and incentive theories, this study proposes a research model with two management incentives as moderating variables between financialization and the enterprise's innovation. First, we analyze the direct relationship between financialization and the enterprise's innovation. Second, we examine the moderating effect of managers' equity incentive and compensation incentives on the relationship between entity financialization and the enterprise's innovation in high-tech/non-high-tech enterprises and state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. This study covers the most recent updated data from both A-share listed companies in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange in China from 2009 to 2019. This study's finding indicates a significant negative impact of entity financialization and the enterprise's innovation. It means that the entity financial has a significant "crowding-out" effect on the enterprise's innovation. This study also confirms that management incentives cannot effectively suppress a "crowding-out" impact of entity financialization on firm innovation because of the principal-agent severe problem in financialization. Finally, considering the heterogeneities of property rights and degrees of dependence on the enterprise's innovation, a "crowding-out" effect of entity financialization on the enterprise's innovation is more significant in high-tech and state-owned enterprises. Managers' equity incentive significantly affects the enterprise's innovation in high-tech enterprises, while the managers' compensation incentive affects the enterprise's innovation in state-owned enterprises. Our study could help the enterprise to improve the company manager's incentive and provide the optimal assets allocation to improve the enterprise's innovation ability. Lastly, this study provides significant policies and recommendations for the public sector high-tech enterprise and private sector high-tech enterprises. Moreover, policies and recommendations are fruitful for the public sector non-high-tech enterprise and private sector non-high-tech enterprise.
本研究考察了金融化、管理者激励与企业创新之间的关系。基于委托代理理论和激励理论,本研究提出了一个以两种管理激励为调节变量的研究模型,该模型位于金融化与企业创新之间。首先,我们分析金融化与企业创新之间的直接关系。其次,我们考察管理者股权激励和薪酬激励在高科技/非高科技企业以及国有企业和非国有企业中对实体金融化与企业创新关系的调节作用。本研究涵盖了2009年至2019年中国深圳和上海证券交易所A股上市公司的最新数据。本研究的结果表明实体金融化对企业创新有显著的负面影响。这意味着实体金融对企业创新具有显著的“挤出”效应。本研究还证实,由于金融化中存在严重的委托代理问题,管理激励无法有效抑制实体金融化对企业创新的“挤出”影响。最后,考虑到产权异质性和企业创新依赖程度,实体金融化对企业创新的“挤出”效应在高科技企业和国有企业中更为显著。管理者股权激励对高科技企业的创新有显著影响,而管理者薪酬激励对国有企业的创新有影响。我们的研究有助于企业改善公司经理的激励机制,并提供最优资产配置以提高企业的创新能力。最后,本研究为公共部门高科技企业和私营部门高科技企业提供了重要的政策建议。此外,这些政策建议对公共部门非高科技企业和私营部门非高科技企业也很有成效。