School of Electronics and Information Engineering, University of Science and Technology Liaoning, Anshan, Liaoning, China.
School of Business Administration, University of Science and Technology Liaoning, Anshan, Liaoning, China.
Sci Rep. 2023 Oct 13;13(1):17360. doi: 10.1038/s41598-023-44116-4.
Taking major emergencies as the research background, the transmission mechanism for panic spread and the decision behaviour of the opinion field are explored in this paper. By using evolutionary game theory to explore the game relationship between the official opinion field and the public opinion field and by considering the existence of strategy dependency in the same game group, the dependence coefficient is introduced to improve replicator dynamics. The dynamic delayed SEIR evolutionary game model is built by combining the epidemic model with the delay effect within the group, and the stability of the proposed model is analysed. The research results show that the strategy dependency among the same game group has positive and negative effects on the evolution process. The evolution of the dynamic delayed panic SEIR evolutionary game spread model under the effect of a positive effect is simulated. The results suggest that the official opinion field and the public opinion field should actively deal with emergencies, formulate effective control strategies to make the panic within the group disappear, and provide theoretical guidance for the relevant government to formulate plans.
以重大突发事件为研究背景，探讨了恐慌传播的传递机制和意见场的决策行为。本文利用进化博弈理论，探讨了官方意见场与公众意见场之间的博弈关系，并考虑了同一博弈群体中策略依存的存在，引入依赖系数改进复制者动态。通过将传染病模型与群体内部的延迟效应相结合，构建了带有延迟效应的 SEIR 进化博弈模型，并对所提出模型的稳定性进行了分析。研究结果表明，同一博弈群体中的策略依存对进化过程具有正负两方面的影响。模拟了在正效应作用下的动态延迟恐慌 SEIR 进化博弈传播模型的演化。结果表明，官方意见场和公众意见场应积极应对突发事件，制定有效的控制策略，使群体内部的恐慌消失，为相关政府制定计划提供理论指导。
