Research Center for Central China Economic and Social Development, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, PR China; Jiangxi Ecological Civilization Research Institute, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, PR China; School of Economics and Management, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, PR China.
School of Economics and Management, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, PR China.
J Environ Manage. 2023 Dec 15;348:119181. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2023.119181. Epub 2023 Oct 23.
In emerging economies, a significant amount of secondary resources are recycled by the informal sector, which can seriously harm the environment. However, some previous studies of industry management policy design ignored geographical factors. This paper introduces Geographic Information Systems into an agent-based cross-regional recycling model, and employs lead-acid batteries as an example. The model quantitatively displays the evolution of recycling markets in 31 provinces in Mainland China. Results show that: (1) High subsidies can significantly increase the number of formal enterprises in the short term, but their effectiveness decreases when the proportion of government funds in subsidies is above 80% in the long run; (2) The number of illegal recycling enterprises increases by 294% in eight inland provinces (e.g., Ningxia, Xinjiang) when all funds are invested in supervision, but this number is quite small in subsidy policy scenarios; (3) In four eastern regions, including Beijing and Tianjin, the number of illegal recycling enterprises decreases by 84% if supervision is more favored than subsidy; (4) In the optimal case where spatiotemporal factors are considered in all 31 regions, illegal recycling enterprises and waste lead emissions can be reduced by 95.59% and 45.85% nationwide. Our proposed recycling model offers a detailed simulation of multiple regions and diverse stakeholders, and serves as a useful reference for targeted recovery policies. Governments in inland regions like Ningxia and Xinjiang should implement subsidy policies, while supervision policies should be implemented in developed regions like Beijing and Tianjin.
在新兴经济体中，大量的二次资源被非正式部门回收，这可能会严重破坏环境。然而，一些先前的产业管理政策设计研究忽略了地理因素。本文将地理信息系统引入基于代理的跨区域回收模型，并以铅酸电池为例。该模型定量展示了中国大陆 31 个省份的回收市场演变。结果表明：（1）高补贴可以在短期内显著增加正规企业的数量，但从长期来看，当政府资金在补贴中的比例超过 80%时，其效果会降低；（2）如果将所有资金都投入监管，在内陆的 8 个省份（如宁夏、新疆）中，非法回收企业的数量将增加 294%，但在补贴政策情景下，这个数字相当小；（3）在北京和天津等四个东部地区，如果监管比补贴更受重视，非法回收企业的数量将减少 84%；（4）在考虑所有 31 个地区的时空因素的最优情况下，全国范围内非法回收企业和废铅排放可以减少 95.59%和 45.85%。我们提出的回收模型为多个地区和不同利益相关者提供了详细的模拟，为有针对性的回收政策提供了有益的参考。宁夏、新疆等内陆地区的政府应实施补贴政策，而北京、天津等发达地区则应实施监管政策。
