Management School, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei province, China.
Centre for Service Science and Engineering, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei province, China.
PLoS One. 2023 Oct 31;18(10):e0284775. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0284775. eCollection 2023.
With the wide application of the "Tender, Auction, and Listing" system for land in China, it is of paramount importance to establish a sound land auction mechanism so as to avoid unreasonable land allocation. However, existing studies only focus on developers who are merely concerned about land combinations and offline auctions with low efficiency and high land unsold rate. To further improve land auction mechanism, we modeled the problem of land allocation as an online combinatorial auction. On this basis, we defined a land correction coefficient and designed an optimal online combinatorial auction mechanism that enabled developers to submit multiple combinations of land. Our designed mechanism proved to satisfy both incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR), which can prevent developers from lying in the auction while winning higher revenue, reducing land unsold rate, increasing developer turnover rate and promoting the stability of land resource allocation rate. Therefore, online combinatorial auction mechanism, both applicable and efficient, is a practical solution for improving land auctions in China.
随着中国“招拍挂”土地制度的广泛应用,建立健全土地拍卖机制以避免不合理的土地配置至关重要。然而,现有研究仅关注开发商,他们仅关注土地组合和效率低下、土地未售出率高的线下拍卖。为了进一步完善土地拍卖机制,我们将土地分配问题建模为在线组合拍卖。在此基础上,我们定义了土地修正系数,并设计了一种最优的在线组合拍卖机制,使开发商能够提交多组土地组合。我们设计的机制证明了满足激励相容(IC)和个体理性(IR),这可以防止开发商在拍卖中撒谎以获得更高的收入,降低土地未售出率,提高开发商周转率,促进土地资源配置率的稳定性。因此,在线组合拍卖机制既适用又高效,是改进中国土地拍卖的一种切实可行的解决方案。