van der Zwet W C, Klomp-Berens E A, Demandt A M P, Dingemans J, van der Veer B M J W, van Alphen L B, Dirks J A M C, Savelkoul P H M
Department of Medical Microbiology, Infectious Diseases & Infection Prevention, Care and Public Health Research Institute (CAPHRI), Maastricht University Medical Center, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Division of Hematology, Department of Internal Medicine, GROW School for Oncology and Developmental Biology, Maastricht University Medical Center, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Infect Prev Pract. 2024 Jan 6;6(1):100335. doi: 10.1016/j.infpip.2023.100335. eCollection 2024 Mar.
Two SARS-CoV-2 nosocomial outbreaks occurred on the haematology ward of our hospital. Patients on the ward were at high risk for severe infection because of their immunocompromised status. Whole Genome Sequencing proved transmission of a particular SARS-CoV-2 variant in each outbreak. The first outbreak (20 patients/31 healthcare workers (HCW)) occurred in November 2020 and was caused by a variant belonging to lineage B.1.221. At that time, there were still uncertainties on mode of transmission of SARS-CoV-2, and vaccines nor therapy were available. Despite HCW wearing II-R masks in all patient contacts and FFP-2 masks during aerosol generating procedures (AGP), the outbreak continued. Therefore, extra measures were introduced. Firstly, regular PCR-screening of asymptomatic patients and HCW; positive patients were isolated and positive HCW were excluded from work as a rule and they were only allowed to resume their work if a follow-up PCR CT-value was ≥30 and were asymptomatic or having only mild symptoms. Secondly, the use of FFP-2 masks was expanded to some long-lasting, close-contact, non-AGPs. After implementing these measures, the incidence of new cases declined gradually. Thirty-seven percent of patients died due to COVID-19. The second outbreak (10 patients/2 HCW) was caused by the highly transmissible omicron BA.1 variant and occurred in February 2022, where transmission occurred on shared rooms despite the extra infection control measures. It was controlled much faster, and the clinical impact was low as the majority of patients was vaccinated; no patients died and symptoms were relatively mild in both patients and HCW.
我院血液科发生了两起新型冠状病毒肺炎医院感染暴发事件。由于病房患者免疫功能低下,他们面临严重感染的高风险。全基因组测序证实每次暴发中均存在特定的新型冠状病毒变异株传播。第一次暴发(20名患者/31名医护人员)发生在2020年11月,由属于B.1.221谱系的变异株引起。当时,新型冠状病毒的传播方式仍存在不确定性,且尚无疫苗和治疗方法。尽管医护人员在所有患者接触中均佩戴II-R口罩,并在气溶胶产生操作(AGP)期间佩戴FFP-2口罩,但暴发仍在继续。因此,采取了额外措施。首先,对无症状患者和医护人员进行定期PCR筛查;阳性患者被隔离,阳性医护人员通常被禁止工作,只有在后续PCR CT值≥30且无症状或仅有轻微症状时才允许恢复工作。其次,将FFP-2口罩的使用扩大到一些持续时间长、密切接触的非AGP操作中。实施这些措施后,新病例的发生率逐渐下降。37%的患者死于新型冠状病毒肺炎。第二次暴发(10名患者/2名医护人员)由高传播性的奥密克戎BA.1变异株引起,发生在2022年2月,尽管采取了额外的感染控制措施,但仍在共用病房发生了传播。此次暴发控制得更快,由于大多数患者接种了疫苗,临床影响较小;没有患者死亡,患者和医护人员的症状相对较轻。