McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada.
J Med Philos. 2024 Mar 14;49(2):147-159. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhae002.
In this article, I side with those who argue that the debate about the definition of "disease" should be reoriented from the question "what is disease" to the question of what it should be. However, I ground my argument on the rejection of the naturalist approach to define disease and the adoption of a normativist approach, according to which the concept of disease is normative and value-laden. Based on this normativist approach, I defend two main theses: (1) that conceptual analysis is not the right method to define disease and that conceptual engineering should be the preferred method and (2) that the method of conceptual engineering should be implemented following the principles of Alexandrova's account of social objectivity in the context of the definition of disease.
在本文中，我支持那些认为关于“疾病”定义的争论应该从“什么是疾病”这个问题重新定向到“应该是什么”这个问题的观点。然而，我的论点是基于拒绝用自然主义方法来定义疾病，并采用规范主义方法，根据这种方法，疾病的概念是规范性的，并且带有价值色彩。基于这种规范主义方法，我捍卫两个主要论点：（1）概念分析不是定义疾病的正确方法，概念工程应该是首选方法；（2）在疾病定义的背景下，应该按照亚历山德罗娃对社会客观性的解释中的原则来实施概念工程方法。
