School of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia.
Med Health Care Philos. 2021 Jun;24(2):291-301. doi: 10.1007/s11019-020-09993-w. Epub 2021 Jan 4.
Since Boorse [Philos Sci 44(4):542-573, 1977] published his paper "Health as a theoretical concept" one of the most lively debates within philosophy of medicine has been on the question of whether health and disease are in some sense 'objective' and 'value-free' or 'subjective' and 'value-laden'. Due to the apparent 'failure' of pure naturalist, constructivist, or normativist accounts, much in the recent literature has appealed to more conciliatory approaches or so-called 'hybrid accounts' of health and disease. A recent paper by Matthewson and Griffiths [J Med Philos 42(4):447-466, 2017], however, may bear the seeds for the revival of purely naturalist approach to health and disease. In this paper, I defend their idea of Biological Normativity against recent criticism by Schwartz [J Med Philos Forum Bioethics Philos Med 42(4):485-502, 2017] and hope to help it flower into a revival of naturalist approaches in the philosophy of medicine.
自布尔斯（Boorse）[《哲学科学》44（4）：542-573，1977]发表其论文《健康作为理论概念》以来，医学哲学中最活跃的争论之一是健康和疾病在某种意义上是“客观的”和“价值中立的”，还是“主观的”和“价值负载的”。由于纯粹的自然主义、建构主义或规范主义解释显然“失败”，最近的文献中大量引用了更调和的方法或所谓的健康和疾病的“混合解释”。然而，马修森和格里菲斯（Matthewson and Griffiths）[《医学哲学杂志》42（4）：447-466，2017]的一篇最近的论文可能为健康和疾病的纯粹自然主义方法的复兴带来了希望。在本文中，我为他们的生物规范性观念辩护，以反对施瓦茨（Schwartz）[《医学哲学杂志论坛生物伦理学哲学医学》42（4）：485-502，2017]的最新批评，并希望帮助它发展成为医学哲学中自然主义方法的复兴。
