Inarimori Kiichi, Honma Souichiro, Miyazono Kengo
Laboratory of Philosophy and Ethics, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan.
Center for Human Nature, Artificial Intelligence, and Neuroscience, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan.
Front Psychol. 2024 Apr 22;15:1369399. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1369399. eCollection 2024.
This article critically examines the experimental philosophy of free will, particularly the interplay between ordinary individuals' compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions. It explores key insights from research studies that propose "natural compatibilism" and "natural incompatibilism". These studies reveal a complex landscape of folk intuitions, where participants appear to exhibit both types of intuitions. Here, we examine error theories, which purport to explain the coexistence of apparently contradictory intuitions: the Affective Performance Error hypothesis, the "Free Will No Matter What" hypothesis, the Bypassing hypothesis, and the Intrusion hypothesis, and the article explores the cognitive errors that could shape individuals' inconsistent perceptions of free will. We then explore three possibilities regarding folk intuitions: most individuals may hold either compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions, both simultaneously, or neither. Our aim is to deepen the understanding of the complex dynamics of intuitions about free will, and we close with suggestions for future studies in experimental philosophy.
本文批判性地审视了自由意志的实验哲学，特别是普通个体的兼容主义和不兼容主义直觉之间的相互作用。它探讨了提出“自然兼容主义”和“自然不兼容主义”的研究中的关键见解。这些研究揭示了民间直觉的复杂图景，参与者似乎表现出这两种直觉。在这里，我们考察了错误理论，这些理论旨在解释明显相互矛盾的直觉的共存：情感表现错误假设、“无论如何都有自由意志”假设、绕过假设和侵入假设，并且本文探讨了可能塑造个体对自由意志不一致认知的认知错误。然后我们探讨了关于民间直觉的三种可能性：大多数个体可能持有兼容主义或不兼容主义直觉，两者同时持有，或者两者都不持有。我们的目的是加深对自由意志直觉复杂动态的理解，最后我们为实验哲学的未来研究提出了建议。
