Malthouse Eugene, Pilgrim Charlie, Sgroi Daniel, Hills Thomas T
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick.
Mathematics for Real-World Systems Centre for Doctoral Training, University of Warwick.
J Exp Psychol Gen. 2024 Jul;153(7):1903. doi: 10.1037/xge0001631.
Reports an error in "When fairness is not enough: The disproportionate contributions of the poor in a collective action problem" by Eugene Malthouse, Charlie Pilgrim, Daniel Sgroi and Thomas T. Hills (, 2023[Nov], Vol 152[11], 3229-3242). The third and final research question in The Collective-Risk Social Dilemma section now appears as follows: 3. If what people perceive as fair is insufficient to solve the problem, under what conditions do groups still manage to succeed? All versions of this article have been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2023-92402-001.) Many of our most pressing challenges, from combating climate change to dealing with pandemics, are collective action problems: situations in which individual and collective interests conflict with each other. In such situations, people face a dilemma about making individually costly but collectively beneficial contributions to the common good. Understanding which factors influence people's willingness to make these contributions is vital for the design of policies and institutions that support the attainment of collective goals. In this study, we investigate how inequalities, and different causes of inequalities, impact individual-level behavior and group-level outcomes. First, we find that what people judged to be fair was not enough to solve the collective action problem: if they acted according to what they thought was fair, they would collectively fail. Second, the level of wealth (rich vs. poor) altered what was judged to be a fair contribution to the public good more than the cause of wealth (merit vs. luck vs. uncertain). Contributions during the game reflected these fairness judgments, with poorer individuals consistently contributing a higher proportion of their wealth than richer participants, which further increased inequality-particularly in successful groups. Finally, the cause of one's wealth was largely irrelevant, mattering most only when it was uncertain, as opposed to resulting from merit or luck. We discuss implications for policymakers and international climate change negotiations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
尤金·马尔特豪斯、查理·皮尔格林、丹尼尔·斯格罗伊和托马斯·T·希尔斯所著的《当公平还不够:穷人在集体行动问题中的不成比例贡献》(2023年11月,第152卷第11期,3229 - 3242页)。“集体风险社会困境”部分的第三个也是最后一个研究问题现在呈现如下:3. 如果人们认为公平的做法不足以解决问题,那么在什么条件下群体仍能成功?本文的所有版本均已更正。(原始文章的以下摘要出现在记录2023 - 92402 - 001中。)我们面临的许多最紧迫挑战,从应对气候变化到应对大流行,都是集体行动问题:即个人利益与集体利益相互冲突的情况。在这种情况下,人们面临着一个两难境地,即要为公共利益做出个人代价高昂但对集体有益的贡献。了解哪些因素会影响人们做出这些贡献的意愿,对于设计支持实现集体目标的政策和制度至关重要。在本研究中,我们调查了不平等以及不平等的不同成因如何影响个体层面的行为和群体层面的结果。首先,我们发现人们认为公平的做法不足以解决集体行动问题:如果他们按照自己认为公平的方式行事,他们将集体失败。其次,财富水平(富人与穷人)比财富成因(功绩、运气与不确定性)更能改变人们对公共利益公平贡献的判断。游戏中的贡献反映了这些公平判断,较贫穷的个体始终比富裕的参与者贡献更高比例 的财富,这进一步加剧了不平等——尤其是在成功的群体中。最后,一个人的财富成因在很大程度上无关紧要,只有在不确定的情况下才最为重要,而不是由功绩或运气导致的。我们讨论了对政策制定者和国际气候变化谈判的影响。(PsycInfo数据库记录 (c) 2024美国心理学会,保留所有权利)