Liu Imogen T
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
New Polit Econ. 2024 Feb 22;29(4):646-660. doi: 10.1080/13563467.2024.2318422. eCollection 2024.
Under what conditions can the state discipline private equity firms into delivering the investment required to meet the coming needs of industrial transformation? States have sought to crowd in private capital to finance industrial development, but the results have so far been less than satisfactory. Prevailing accounts of financial industry power largely characterise an arms-length state-finance relationship that has unfolded in private-led markets where private equity firms have contributed to the secular growth in non-productive economic activity. This article problematises the assumption of private-led markets and argues that state-led markets present a counterfactual in which the disbursement of public money entails strict policy discipline and tight embedding between the state and private equity firms, which provides the conditions for them to emerge as unlikely champions of industrial policy. Two cases of co-investment between Chinese and European sovereign wealth funds demonstrate the power dynamics at play. Where PE firms in the Sino-Irish co-investment facilitated the international scaling of Irish firms in China, the PE firms operating in Europe failed to embed Chinese firms into regional supply chains in the Sino-Belgian co-investment.
在何种条件下,国家能够约束私募股权公司,使其进行投资以满足即将到来的产业转型需求?各国一直试图吸引私人资本为产业发展融资,但迄今为止,结果并不尽如人意。关于金融业权力的主流观点大多描述了一种在私人主导市场中形成的不干预的国家与金融关系,在这种市场中,私募股权公司推动了非生产性经济活动的长期增长。本文对私人主导市场这一假设提出质疑,并认为国家主导的市场提供了一种反事实情况,即公共资金的支出需要严格的政策约束以及国家与私募股权公司之间的紧密联系,这为私募股权公司成为不太可能的产业政策拥护者创造了条件。中国和欧洲主权财富基金的两个共同投资案例展示了其中的权力动态。在中爱共同投资中,私募股权公司推动了爱尔兰公司在中国的国际扩张,而在中比共同投资中,在欧洲运营的私募股权公司未能将中国公司融入区域供应链。