Qin Xuerui, Pan Xiao, Li Libo
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Yibin University, China.
Heliyon. 2024 Jun 25;10(14):e33123. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e33123. eCollection 2024 Jul 30.
The labor administrative penalties of a city are enforced by the city's labor security administrative department for any breaches of labor security laws, regulations, or norms. The severity of labor administrative penalties differs across cities; thus, this study aims to determine how a city's penalties affect the labor income share of enterprises. We conduct a practical investigation to examine the influence of labor administrative penalties imposed by cities on the internal income distribution structure of firms. This study utilizes theoretical analysis and data on labor administrative penalties in Chinese cities, as well as samples of A-share listed businesses in Shanghai and Shenzhen. From the perspective of the internal income distribution structure, we examine the labor income share of firms and discover that labor administrative penalties in cities significantly raise the labor income share of these enterprises. The share of labor income of enterprises registered in the city increases by 0.9707 % for each additional unit of cities' labor administrative penalties (i.e., for a one-time labor administrative penalty per 10,000 people). The conclusion remains valid even after excluding the endogeneity and robustness tests. Regional labor administrative penalties can enhance the internal management of enterprise quality by promoting transparency and deterring non-compliance. This, in turn, mitigates credit risk for enterprises by fostering stable labor relations. Enhancing the quality of internal control and mitigating credit risk can lead to an increase in the labor income share of firms. An analysis of heterogeneity shows that the impact of labor administrative penalties in cities on increasing the percentage of labor income varies. The impact is more pronounced for state-owned firms and enterprises with low levels of investment.
城市的劳动行政处罚由该市劳动保障行政部门对任何违反劳动保障法律、法规或规范的行为实施。不同城市的劳动行政处罚力度不同；因此，本研究旨在确定城市的处罚如何影响企业的劳动收入份额。我们进行了一项实证调查，以考察城市实施的劳动行政处罚对企业内部收入分配结构的影响。本研究利用理论分析以及中国城市劳动行政处罚的数据，还有上海和深圳A股上市公司的样本。从内部收入分配结构的角度，我们考察了企业的劳动收入份额，发现城市的劳动行政处罚显著提高了这些企业的劳动收入份额。城市劳动行政处罚每增加一个单位（即每万人一次劳动行政处罚），在该市注册企业的劳动收入份额就增加0.9707%。即使在排除内生性和稳健性检验后，该结论仍然成立。地区劳动行政处罚可以通过提高透明度和威慑违规行为来加强企业质量的内部管理。这反过来又通过促进稳定的劳动关系来降低企业的信用风险。提高内部控制质量和降低信用风险会导致企业劳动收入份额增加。异质性分析表明，城市劳动行政处罚对提高劳动收入百分比的影响各不相同。对国有企业和低投资水平企业的影响更为显著。
