School of Economics and Management, Southwest Petroleum University, Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, China.
School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, China.
PLoS One. 2024 Sep 5;19(9):e0309387. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0309387. eCollection 2024.
This study utilizes data from A-share listed companies between 2011 and 2020 to empirically investigate the impact and mechanism of public welfare donations on the internal income gap of enterprises. The research findings indicate that public welfare donations significantly increase the per capita salary of management, while their impact on the per capita salary of ordinary employees is not significant, thus leading to an expansion of the internal income gap within enterprises. The results from mechanism testing reveal that the income tax benefits resulting from charitable donations and the rise in corporate operating income have contributed to an increase in excess rent shared by enterprises and employees. Due to a stronger bargaining power, management shares more excess rents, thereby widening the income gap within the enterprise. Heterogeneity analysis demonstrates that public welfare donations have a greater impact on the internal income gap of non-state-owned enterprises; however, limiting executive compensation and enhancing employees' bargaining power can mitigate this widening effect caused by public welfare donations on enterprise's internal income gap. The research value of this study is threefold. Firstly, there is a scarcity of studies on the impact of public welfare donations on the income gap within enterprises, and this study contributes to enriching the research in this area. Secondly, this paper examines the effect of tax incentives for public welfare donations on the internal income gap of enterprises, thereby deepening the research on the impact of tax reduction and fee reduction, as well as expanding our understanding of corporate income tax preferential policies. Thirdly, it offers insights into improving enterprise compensation systems and enhancing corporate governance. Senior executives can potentially allocate more excess rent through their strong bargaining power. If their compensation remains unrestricted, it may lead to a widening internal income gap and negatively affect company operational efficiency.
本研究利用 2011 年至 2020 年 A 股上市公司的数据，实证检验了公益捐赠对企业内部收入差距的影响及其作用机制。研究结果表明，公益捐赠显著提高了管理层人均薪酬，而对普通员工人均薪酬的影响并不显著，从而导致企业内部收入差距扩大。机制检验结果表明，慈善捐赠带来的所得税优惠和企业营业收入的增加，导致企业和员工分享的超额租金增加。由于管理层具有更强的谈判能力，他们分享了更多的超额租金，从而扩大了企业内部的收入差距。异质性分析表明，公益捐赠对非国有企业内部收入差距的影响更大；然而，限制高管薪酬和增强员工谈判能力可以减轻公益捐赠对企业内部收入差距扩大的影响。本研究具有三重研究价值。首先，关于公益捐赠对企业内部收入差距的影响的研究较少，本研究丰富了这一领域的研究。其次，本文考察了公益捐赠的税收激励对企业内部收入差距的影响，从而深化了对减税降费影响的研究，并拓展了对企业所得税优惠政策的认识。第三，它为改善企业薪酬制度和加强公司治理提供了思路。高管可能通过其强大的谈判能力来分配更多的超额租金。如果不对其薪酬加以限制，可能会导致内部收入差距扩大，并对公司运营效率产生负面影响。
