Basu Kaushik, Weibull Jörgen
Department of Economics, Cornell University, Uris Hall 422, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA.
Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, Stockholm 113 83, Sweden.
R Soc Open Sci. 2024 Aug 7;11(8):240358. doi: 10.1098/rsos.240358. eCollection 2024 Aug.
Greater knowledge is always an advantage for a rational individual. However, this article shows that for a group of rational individuals greater knowledge can backfire, leading to a worse outcome for all. Surprisingly, this can happen even when new knowledge does not mean the discovery of a new action but simply provides a deeper understanding of the interaction at stake. More specifically, enhanced knowledge about the current state of nature may hinder cooperation among purely self-interested individuals. The paper describes this paradoxical possibility-a 'knowledge curse'-and analyses the evolutionary process that occurs if, initially, only a few people have access to the greater knowledge. It concludes with a tentative comment on ways to avert this potential knowledge backlash.
对于一个理性的个体而言,知识越丰富往往越具优势。然而,本文表明,对于一群理性个体来说,知识的增加可能会适得其反,导致所有人的结果更糟。令人惊讶的是,即便新知识并非意味着发现新行动,而仅仅是对相关互动有更深入的理解,这种情况仍可能发生。更具体地说,对自然当前状态的更多了解可能会阻碍纯粹自利个体之间的合作。本文描述了这种矛盾的可能性——“知识诅咒”——并分析了如果最初只有少数人能够获取更多知识时所发生的进化过程。最后,本文对避免这种潜在知识反作用的方法给出了初步评论。