Si Ruishi, Liu Xin, Zhang Xueqian, Chen Yi, Xiang Wen, Liu Mingyue, Tan Yongfeng, Yang Guotao
Academy of the Zhonghuaminzu Community, Ningxia University, Yinchuan 750021, China.
School of Public Administration, Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi'an 710055, China.
One Health. 2024 Jul 20;19:100859. doi: 10.1016/j.onehlt.2024.100859. eCollection 2024 Dec.
Antimicrobial resistance caused by the overuse of antimicrobials by farmers is an essential health issue. Currently, signing contracts between farmers and cooperatives has become crucial for small farmers to integrate into the modern agricultural industry chain. Unlike vertical government governance, which aims to intervene in the overuse of antimicrobials by farmers through many mandatory or incentive measures, contract governance refers to the social governance model that clarifies rights and obligations between farmers and cooperatives to ensure the adequate performance of contracts, which is especially beneficial to regulate farmers' safe production behavior such as the standard use of antimicrobials. However, there is a research gap concerning the effectiveness of contract governance in inhibiting farmers' overuse of animal antimicrobials. This study applies propensity score matching and mediation analysis method to assess how contract governance affects the overuse of antimicrobials by hog farmers. The paper uses data from 498 hog farmers of China's Hebei, Henan, and Hubei provinces to explore the impact and underlying mechanisms of contract governance on antimicrobial overuse in agriculture. The results showed that contract governance was found to inhibit the overuse of antimicrobials, with the amount paid for antimicrobials reduced by 118 yuan/household. We found evidence that this effect is exerted through three mechanisms: cooperative supervision (), technical guidance (), and product premium perception (). The , , and mediation effects accounted for 19.94%, 27.90%, and 26.93% of the total impact, respectively. Therefore, policy implications of these results include strengthening the standard of contract signing procedures and the integrity of executing contracts, increasing the market premium for products that meet the antimicrobial residue standards, and enhancing farmers' knowledge and contracting ability.
农民过度使用抗菌药物导致的抗菌药物耐药性是一个重要的健康问题。目前，农民与合作社签订合同已成为小农户融入现代农业产业链的关键。与旨在通过许多强制性或激励性措施干预农民过度使用抗菌药物的垂直政府治理不同，合同治理是指一种社会治理模式，它明确了农民与合作社之间的权利和义务，以确保合同的充分履行，这对于规范农民的安全生产行为（如抗菌药物的规范使用）特别有益。然而，关于合同治理在抑制农民过度使用动物抗菌药物方面的有效性存在研究空白。本研究应用倾向得分匹配和中介分析方法来评估合同治理如何影响生猪养殖户抗菌药物的过度使用。本文使用了来自中国河北、河南和湖北三省498户生猪养殖户的数据，以探讨合同治理对农业抗菌药物过度使用的影响及潜在机制。结果表明，合同治理被发现可以抑制抗菌药物的过度使用，每户抗菌药物支出减少118元。我们发现有证据表明，这种效果是通过三种机制发挥作用的：合作社监督（）、技术指导（）和产品溢价感知（）。 、 和 的中介效应分别占总影响的19.94%、27.90%和26.93%。因此，这些结果的政策含义包括加强合同签订程序的规范和合同执行的完整性，提高符合抗菌药物残留标准产品的市场溢价，以及增强农民的知识和签约能力。
