Li Changmin, Zhang Xun, Li Shengnan, Xie Xiaoqiang
School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai, 200444, China.
School of Mathematics, Physics and Statistics, Shanghai Polytechnic University, Shanghai, 201209, China.
Heliyon. 2024 Sep 25;10(19):e38408. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e38408. eCollection 2024 Oct 15.
The Stackelberg game analysis of an Energy Performance Contracting(EPC) is established to correctly analyze the impact of altruistic preference behaviors on the decision-makers, energy service companies(ESCOs) and energy-consuming units(EUs). Its motivation comes from the fact that, to achieve a win-win situation, EUs usually engage in altruistic behaviors, but the implementation results of the EPC are always contrary to their expectations. Using nonlinear optimization theory, analyzed the decisions of the Stackelberg models under different altruistic preference attributes, and then compared the impacts of altruistic preferences on decisions and profits. Results reveal: (1)compared to a situation lacking altruistic preference, when the leader, the EU, has an altruistic preference, the EU only needs to transfer a small part of its own interests to significantly increase the ESCO's profit and ultimately improve the overall EPC profit; (2) the altruistic preference of the ESCO functions akin to a "poison," engrossing the company in the satisfaction derived from the increased revenue of the energy-consuming entity and gradually eroding its own profits; and (3)the altruistic preference behavior of both parties is a kind of "benefit transfer behavior," which is conducive to stable operation and long-term development of EPC industry. The research results can provide a theoretical reference to enhance the development of energy-saving service industry.
建立了能源绩效合同（EPC）的斯塔克尔伯格博弈分析，以正确分析利他偏好行为对决策者、能源服务公司（ESCO）和能源消费单位（EU）的影响。其动机源于这样一个事实，即欧盟为了实现双赢局面，通常会采取利他行为，但EPC的实施结果却总是与他们的预期相悖。利用非线性优化理论，分析了不同利他偏好属性下斯塔克尔伯格模型的决策，然后比较了利他偏好对决策和利润的影响。结果表明：（1）与缺乏利他偏好的情况相比，当领导者欧盟具有利他偏好时，欧盟只需转移一小部分自身利益，就能显著提高ESCO的利润，最终提高EPC的整体利润；（2）ESCO的利他偏好起到了“毒药”的作用，使公司沉迷于能源消费实体收入增加带来的满足感，逐渐侵蚀自身利润；（3）双方的利他偏好行为是一种“利益转移行为”，有利于EPC行业的稳定运营和长期发展。研究结果可为促进节能服务业发展提供理论参考。
